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1. Introduction 
In recent years, a large number of countries have made reporting under International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) mandatory.  This switch is arguably the largest reporting 
standards change in accounting history and, not surprisingly, has been examined extensively 
(see, e.g., Barth, 2006; Hail et al., 2010; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007, for overviews).  Much of the 
literature points towards positive and often substantial capital-market effects around IFRS 
introduction (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; Byard et al., 2011).  However, following Daske et al. 
(2008), we note that the sources of these effects and, in particular, the extent to which they can 
be attributed to IFRS adoption remain unclear.  Considering the continued trend towards 
worldwide IFRS reporting, a better understanding of the sources that led to the observed capital-
market benefits is of fundamental importance to researchers, policy makers, and regulators. 
Aside from conceptual reasons to be skeptical about the capital-market benefits from a 
switch to mandatory IFRS reporting (which we discuss in Section 2), there are several empirical 
concerns about the sources of the documented effects.  First, many countries adopted IFRS 
reporting around the same time.  This clustering in calendar time makes it difficult to empirically 
isolate the effects of IFRS reporting.  Studies analyzing the capital-market outcomes of IFRS 
reporting could be confounded by unrelated institutional changes and/or economic shocks that 
happen to occur in the same time period.  The adoption of IFRS in the European Union (EU) is a 
case in point.  Starting with the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999, the EU passed a 
series of directives (e.g., on insider trading regulation) to improve financial market regulation, 
many of which were implemented around the time of IFRS adoption (e.g., Christensen et al., 
2013a; CRA, 2009; FSAP, 1999).  As Daske et al. (2008) discuss, these concurrent institutional 
changes could explain why they find capital-market effects around the introduction of mandatory 
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IFRS reporting in the EU but not elsewhere.  Consequently, they caution readers not to attribute 
the documented effects to IFRS adoption alone and highlight several alternative explanations. 
Second, aside from unrelated shocks and changes that merely happen to be concurrent, it is 
also possible that institutional changes are explicitly tied to IFRS adoption.  Again, the EU 
serves as an example.  EC Regulation No. 1606/2002, which introduced IFRS reporting starting 
in 2005, requires member states to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance.  As a result, 
many EU member states bundled IFRS adoption with changes in financial reporting 
enforcement.  Such changes raise the possibility that the observed capital-market outcomes 
reflect at least in part enforcement changes with respect to financial reporting, rather than the 
switch in the accounting standards (see also Daske et al., 2008).  Moreover, the switch in 
standards and the changes in enforcement could mutually reinforce each other.  Understanding 
the relative roles of various institutional changes, and determining whether the observed capital-
market effects around the time of mandatory IFRS adoption are indeed caused by the switch in 
accounting standards or something else is central to accounting research.  The purpose of this 
paper is to further investigate the role of IFRS. 
The above discussion highlights that IFRS studies face a potential correlated omitted 
variable and identification problem.  Based on prior evidence, we can broadly distinguish 
between four explanations for the observed capital market benefits after IFRS adoption: (i) the 
switch from local GAAP to IFRS reporting played a primary role; (ii) IFRS adoption had capital-
market benefits but only in countries with strong institutions and legal systems; (iii) countries 
make enforcement changes to support the introduction of IFRS, and it is this bundle that is 
responsible for the capital-market effects, and (iv) IFRS had little effect, but other institutional 
changes or economic shocks that are unrelated to financial reporting drive the observed capital-
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market benefits.1  We design a series of tests to distinguish between these explanations.  We use 
panel-data techniques that estimate the liquidity effects within certain groups of countries and 
then compare these estimates across groups that differ with respect to IFRS adoption and 
enforcement changes to draw inferences about the potential role of IFRS reporting.  To do so, we 
construct a novel dataset of whether and when substantive enforcement changes occurred in 56 
IFRS and non-IFRS adoption countries from 2001 to 2009 by surveying national securities 
regulators, technical partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers, academics, and public sources. 
Given the purpose of this study, the main analysis is centered on capital-market effects 
starting around the time of IFRS adoption.2  We examine market liquidity because it has a clear 
theoretical link to reporting quality, can be measured over short intervals, and is less anticipatory 
in nature than other economic constructs like cost of capital.  The latter two features allow us to 
exploit (within-year) differences in the timing of IFRS adoption and (unrelated) institutional 
changes and hence to empirically separate them, which is difficult to achieve with capital-market 
outcomes that adjust slowly or are anticipatory in nature.  Specifically, we use bid-ask spreads 
and a liquidity factor that combines four individual proxies of market liquidity, following Daske 
et al. (2008) and Lang et al. (2011).  In the main analysis, we estimate quarterly panel 
regressions and include fixed effects for industry, country, and each quarter in EU, non-EU 
IFRS, and non-IFRS countries.  Including separate quarter-year fixed effects for each of the three 
country groups implies that the coefficients of interest are estimated within group by comparing 
liquidity averages across realizations of the treatment variables in EU, non-EU IFRS, and non-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  For (iii), the effects could be solely driven by enforcement changes, or alternatively, IFRS and enforcement 
changes could reinforce each other. To distinguish between these two possibilities in a two-by-two ANOVA, 
we would need all four cases plus independent assignment of IFRS and enforcement changes. Such data does 
not exist, which is why we only attempt to distinguish between explanations (i)-(iv). Furthermore, we note that 
for (iii) other factors that are correlated with the concurrent enforcement changes could play a role. 
2  We estimate persistent level shifts in market liquidity (rather than short-term effects) in this study. We use the 
term ‘around IFRS adoption’ to indicate that the change in liquidity begins when IFRS becomes mandatory. 
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IFRS countries, respectively.  The time trends are fully flexible and should absorb unrelated 
shocks and liquidity trends within each group.  The three specific country groups are motivated 
by prior evidence showing heterogeneity in the capital-market effects around IFRS adoption with 
effects concentrated in the EU (e.g., Daske et al., 2008).3  Our design also uses variation 
stemming from firms whose first-time IFRS reports fall in different quarters depending on their 
fiscal-year ends as well as firms that did not have to adopt IFRS at all or at a later point in time, 
for instance, because they released only legal entity financial statements or had only public debt 
securities outstanding.  This variation enables us to also introduce separate quarter-year fixed 
effects per country and to provide within-country estimates as a sensitivity check. 
We use binary indicator variables of whether and when countries made substantive changes 
to the enforcement of financial reporting over the sample period.  Five EU countries (Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.) bundled IFRS introduction with a substantive 
change in enforcement, other countries (e.g., Sweden, Hong Kong, Turkey) made substantive 
enforcement changes after IFRS adoption, and one country (Japan) changed enforcement before 
having adopted IFRS.  The changes include but are not limited to the creation of new supervisory 
agencies or the introduction of proactive reviews.  While we deem these changes as substantive 
for the respective country, we note that the changes are not identical across countries (see 
Appendix for details). 
The first set of tests using our panel-regression design confirms that the increase in market 
liquidity following IFRS adoption is concentrated in the EU.  Next, we examine whether new EU 
directives (not directly tied to IFRS) are responsible for these liquidity improvements, rather than 
the IFRS mandate.  We include indicator variables for five key EU directives that are part of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  We include Iceland and Norway in the EU sample as they belong to the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
agreed, inter alia, to adopt the EU capital market directives in exchange for access to the EU’s single market. 
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FSAP or, in our sensitivity analyses, use separate quarter-year fixed effects for each country, 
which control for arbitrary quarterly shocks to market liquidity in a country, including the effects 
of the FSAP directives.4  We still find significant market liquidity benefits around IFRS adoption 
in the EU.  Thus, it is unlikely that concurrent EU directives or other unrelated economic shocks 
drive the liquidity changes, which largely rules out explanation (iv). 
Next, extending Daske et al. (2008),5 we show that the liquidity benefits around IFRS 
adoption are not consistently present throughout the EU.  They are limited to five EU countries 
that made substantive changes to their enforcement of financial reporting around the same time 
IFRS became mandatory.  The enforcement changes are expected to become fully effective when 
firms start reporting under IFRS.  While the results suggest that concurrent changes in reporting 
enforcement play a crucial role for the observed liquidity benefits around IFRS adoption, it is 
important to note that in these tests IFRS adoption and enforcement changes are bundled and 
hence cannot be separated.  The magnitude of the coefficient estimates suggests an increase in 
liquidity between 18 and 23 percent relative to pre-IFRS liquidity levels, which we can translate 
into mean (median) trading cost savings between US$ 0.35 (0.11) and 1.5 (0.29) million per year 
and sample firm, i.e., 0.09 (0.06) to 0.22 (0.16) percent of market value.  This magnitude is 
clearly economically significant, when considering the recurring nature of the savings, but also 
not too large to be implausible. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  Country-specific quarter-year fixed effects control for the effects of the FSAP directives because the directives 
apply to all firms trading on regulated markets from a certain (country-specific) quarter onwards. Firms from 
unregulated markets like the Alternative Investment Market in London (AIM) are excluded from our sample. 
See also Christensen et al. (2013a). 
5  Even though there exist several research design differences between Daske et al. (2008) and our study (e.g. use 
of yearly versus quarterly observations, one versus five sample years post IFRS adoption, clustering of 
standard errors), the results are strikingly consistent. In fact, Daske et al. (2008) already caution “to attribute 
the capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate” because 
“[m]any adopting countries make concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which 
likely play into [the] findings” (p. 1086). Our study examines this conjecture. 
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Our second set of tests establishes that the liquidity effects in the five EU countries do not 
simply reflect differences in the pre-existing level of enforcement or regulatory quality.  As the 
countries with concurrent enforcement changes are all countries with relatively strong legal 
systems and a proven track record of implementing regulation, one could argue that our tests 
merely mirror prior work showing that capital-market effects around IFRS adoption are stronger 
or concentrated in such economies.  To rule out explanation (ii) and disentangle enforcement 
changes from pre-existing regimes, we explicitly account for differences in regulatory quality 
when estimating the liquidity effects around IFRS introduction.6  We show that splitting our 
sample into countries with high and low regulatory quality does not lead to the same findings as 
splitting by concurrent enforcement changes.  In particular, the liquidity effects in countries with 
high regulatory quality but without concurrent enforcement changes are statistically insignificant 
in most specifications and always significantly smaller than the effects in the five EU countries 
with bundled enforcement changes and IFRS adoption.  Similarly, we find no liquidity effects 
outside the EU even in countries with high regulatory quality.  The latter result is not a matter of 
power as the respective coefficients are generally close to zero and precisely estimated.  Thus, 
our results are inconsistent with an interpretation that IFRS adoption yields liquidity benefits as 
long as the standards are properly enforced because it is difficult to argue that countries with 
strong institutions and legal enforcement as well as a strong past track record for implementing 
regulation well would not enforce IFRS. 
The remaining tests examine settings for which IFRS adoption and changes in financial 
reporting enforcement occur at different times, allowing us to gauge the relative importance of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  In the main analyses, we use the regulatory quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2009) as a proxy for a 
country’s general ability to implement regulation and government policies. However, the results are robust to 
using other common measures for the quality of countries’ legal and institutional systems, including the rule of 
law index (see Section 4.2). 
 7!
the two factors.  Our third set of tests exploits the fact that some firms already report under IFRS 
on a voluntary basis and should experience only minor (or no) changes in the accounting 
standards when IFRS become mandatory.  Yet, these firms are affected by enforcement changes 
that are introduced around the mandate.  Thus, we analyze whether the liquidity effects around 
the IFRS mandate are different for voluntary adopters in countries with concurrent enforcement 
changes and voluntary adopters in countries without such changes.7  Market liquidity increases 
for voluntary IFRS adopters around the time IFRS reporting becomes mandatory but, consistent 
with our first test, only in EU countries with concurrent enforcement changes.  The results 
suggest that changes in financial reporting enforcement play a crucial role for the liquidity 
benefits around IFRS adoption.  They also cast doubt on the existence of widespread 
comparability (or network) effects from the IFRS mandate and are inconsistent with the 
explanation that IFRS adoption itself is the primary source of the capital-market benefits.  
However, these tests cannot rule out that IFRS (or, more generally, high-quality accounting 
standards) play some role for the liquidity effects, for instance, by being a precondition for 
enforcement changes to be effective. 
In our fourth set of tests, we no longer center the analysis solely on IFRS adoption but also 
examine liquidity effects when countries change the enforcement of financial reporting at a 
different point in time.  For instance, Sweden, Hong Kong and Turkey made substantive changes 
to the enforcement of financial reporting after they had moved to IFRS.  For these countries, the 
effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes can be observed separately.  However, they 
are still linked in the sense that IFRS adoption always precedes the enforcement changes.  Thus, 
we do not observe enforcement changes independent of IFRS adoption.  For this reason, we also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  This test also controls for spillover or network effects from mandatory IFRS reporting on voluntary adopters 
(e.g., due to increased comparability) because such effects presumably occur in all IFRS countries. 
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study liquidity effects in Japan, which made substantive enforcement changes in 2005, but has 
not yet moved to IFRS reporting.  Although the enforcement changes are not necessarily 
comparable, these tests speak to the question of whether IFRS reporting is a necessary condition 
for enforcement changes to have liquidity effects.  We find significant liquidity effects around 
substantive enforcement changes irrespective of whether countries already require IFRS 
reporting or have not yet adopted IFRS. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, it highlights that IFRS studies 
face major omitted variable problems by pointing to several potential explanations for the 
observed capital-market effects around IFRS adoption aside from the change in accounting 
standards itself.  We propose an identification strategy that exploits novel data on institutional 
changes, the high frequency of liquidity data, corresponding fixed effects as well as differences 
in fiscal-year ends to distinguish between explanations.  Second, we show liquidity effects after 
the IFRS mandate that are related to financial reporting.  Thus, they are not spurious in the sense 
that they are driven by arbitrary shocks or changes in the institutional environment unrelated to 
financial reporting.  As pointed out in Daske et al. (2008), spurious effects are a major concern, 
especially for the EU, and they are difficult to rule out in studies that rely on yearly observations 
and/or slow-moving capital-market proxies.  That said, the finding that the observed liquidity 
effects are likely caused by improvements in financial reporting has to be interpreted carefully.  
It does not imply that IFRS adoption is responsible for the effects.  Several of our results suggest 
otherwise.  In particular, we show that IFRS adoption in countries with strong legal and 
regulatory systems does not necessarily yield liquidity benefits.  In fact, there is no evidence of 
such benefits around IFRS adoption outside the EU regardless of the institutional environment.  
This evidence suggests that we should revisit prior findings demonstrating heterogeneous effects 
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based on partitions of countries’ pre-existing legal and institutional systems.  Third, our results 
suggest that substantive enforcement changes play a critical role for the observed liquidity 
improvements around IFRS adoption.  We show liquidity benefits for countries with 
enforcement changes, irrespective of whether they occur around the time of IFRS adoption, at a 
later point in time or, in the case of Japan, without having first moved to IFRS.  While 
enforcement changes provide a plausible explanation, we emphasize that other concurrent (and 
therefore correlated) changes to the financial reporting system (e.g., audit regulation) could play 
into our findings as well.  The purpose of this study is not to show the effect of enforcement but 
to study the role of IFRS.  We conclude that the change to IFRS is unlikely to be the main or 
even an important driver of the observed capital-market effects. 
In Section 2, we discuss related literature and develop alternative explanations for prior 
evidence.  In Section 3, we outline the research design, describe the construction of a novel 
dataset with regulatory changes around the mandatory introduction of IFRS, and provide 
descriptive statistics on the sample.  Section 4 contains the results of the four tests along with 
several robustness checks.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Prior evidence and alternative explanations for capital-market effects 
Considering the historical importance of global IFRS adoption as a regulatory event, it is not 
surprising that there are many empirical studies as well as an ongoing debate among academics, 
regulators, and practitioners about the effects of this change.  To date, many studies document 
positive capital-market consequences after the mandatory switch to IFRS reporting (e.g., 
Brüggemann et al., 2013, for an overview).  Among other things, studies show positive abnormal 
stock returns during important events leading up to IFRS adoption (Armstrong et al., 2010); an 
increase in market liquidity and decrease in cost of capital (Daske et al., 2008, 2013; Li, 2010; 
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Florou and Kosi, 2013); more foreign investments in debt and equity instruments of firms 
domiciled in IFRS adopting countries (Beneish et al., 2010; DeFond et al., 2011; Brüggemann et 
al., 2012) together with a reduction in home bias among U.S. investors (Khurana and Michas, 
2011; Shima and Gordon, 2011); higher information content of IFRS earnings (Landsman et al., 
2012); an increase in stock price informativeness (Beuselinck et al., 2009); and improvements in 
financial analysts’ information environment (Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Horton et al., 
2013).8  Based on these findings, one could conclude that mandatory IFRS adoption has 
improved the transparency and comparability of financial statements as well as reduced 
information asymmetries. 
However, this conclusion is premature for several reasons.  First, it is conceptually not 
obvious why we would expect mandatory IFRS reporting to yield substantial capital-market 
effects.  On one hand, adopting a single high-quality set of accounting standards could improve 
the transparency and comparability of financial statements.  The idea is that better reporting and 
disclosure benefit capital markets, for instance, by reducing information asymmetries, increasing 
liquidity, and lowering the cost of capital (see, e.g., Hail et al., 2010, for details).  But the counter 
argument is that financial reporting standards grant managers significant discretion in their 
application and, as a result, it is unclear whether forcing firms to use IFRS instead of local 
GAAP necessarily improves transparency and comparability.  Adopting new standards is 
unlikely to alter managers’ reporting incentives and the new standards might not fit a country’s 
institutional environment (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006).  Moreover, it is 
important to recognize that the IFRS mandate does not introduce accounting rules for the first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  Evidence of changes in the properties of accounting earnings (rather than in capital market outcomes) around 
mandatory IFRS adoption is more mixed with several studies finding improvements in ‘accounting quality’ 
(e.g., Gordon et al., 2009; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011; Barth et al., 2012), while others find no or the 
opposite effects (e.g., Christensen et al., 2008; Atwood et al., 2011; Capkun et al., 2011; Ahmed et al., 2013). 
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time.  Countries had local accounting standards prior to IFRS, and these standards often were 
quite similar to IFRS, for instance, in the U.K., the Netherlands, or Norway (e.g., Bae et al., 
2008).  Thus, the counter argument does not imply that accounting standards do not matter at all.  
It simply contends that the change to IFRS may not have major effects, e.g., due to the discretion 
in the standards and the role of firms’ reporting incentives (see also Daske et al., 2013). 
Second, prior studies document substantial heterogeneity in the capital-market effects 
around IFRS adoption.  Most of them find larger benefits for firms domiciled in countries with 
stronger legal and institutional systems.  For instance, Daske et al. (2008) show that market 
liquidity increases after IFRS adoption, but only in the EU or in countries with strong rule of 
law.  Similarly, Byard et al. (2011) find that analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion 
decrease around mandatory IFRS adoption, but only in countries with strong legal regimes that 
also have large differences between local GAAP and IFRS.  Landsman et al. (2012) show that 
the increase in information content of earnings announcements after IFRS adoption depends on 
the strength of countries’ legal systems.  One common interpretation of this evidence is that 
mandatory IFRS reporting yields significant capital-market benefits as long as countries have 
strong legal and institutional systems ensuring that the new standards are properly implemented 
and enforced.  However, as discussed in the introduction, the clustered nature of IFRS adoption 
makes the analysis vulnerable to concurrent but unrelated economic shocks and institutional 
changes.  If such confounding factors are correlated with the strength of countries’ legal and 
institutional systems, they could explain the observed heterogeneity in the capital-market effects 
rather than differences in the implementation of the standards (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013a). 
Third, countries could make other changes to the financial reporting system at the same time 
they introduce mandatory IFRS reporting.  Moreover, these changes could be associated with the 
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strength of countries’ preexisting legal and institutional systems, explaining the aforementioned 
heterogeneity in the effects.  For instance, countries could use the introduction of IFRS as an 
opportunity to improve enforcement of financial reporting.  This bundling makes it even more 
difficult to attribute the observed capital-market effects.  If the switch to IFRS and the change in 
enforcement are complements, for instance, because IFRS are easier to enforce, then the change 
in standards and enforcement have joint effects.  It is also possible that the effects are additive in 
that each element contributes independently to the capital-market effects, or it could be that only 
one of the elements matters.  Differentiating between these cases is difficult, especially 
considering that changes in the elements are unlikely to be independent or randomly assigned. 
The introduction of IFRS in the EU provides an illustration of the empirical challenges.  It is 
a particularly relevant case in light of prior evidence showing that the capital-market benefits 
around IFRS adoption are concentrated in the EU (e.g., Hail and Leuz, 2007; Daske et al., 2008; 
Li, 2010).  Starting with the FSAP in 1999, the EU instituted a series of directives geared 
towards improving its financial market regulation (e.g., FSAP, 1999; CRA, 2009).  One element 
of the FSAP is EC Regulation No. 1606/2002 (also called IAS Regulation), which requires the 
use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of most publicly traded firms domiciled in 
the EU as of the fiscal year beginning on or after January 1st, 2005.  Compared to national GAAP 
requirements, the switch to IFRS often involves changes in the measurement rules as well as 
extensions in disclosure.9  Clearly, mandatory IFRS adoption marks an important regulatory 
event for the accounting systems of the EU member states.  At the same time, the IAS 
Regulation also requires member states to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with 
the new reporting standards (Berger, 2010).  However, the IAS Regulation is not specific as to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  For instance, using the Bae et al. (2008) metric of accounting differences between national GAAP and IFRS, 
the scores in the EU range from a low of one in the U.K. to a maximum of 18 (out of 21) in Luxembourg. 
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what constitutes appropriate enforcement and how member states should achieve it.  Hence, it 
affords member states significant latitude with respect to the enforcement of the IFRS mandate, 
which is what gives rise to concurrent changes in financial reporting enforcement in some but 
not all EU member states.  Countries that choose to initiate enforcement changes concurrent to 
IFRS adoption are likely different from those that do not.  In particular, it is possible that 
bundling countries make several changes to support the introduction of IFRS adoption, including 
but not necessarily limited to the concurrent enforcement changes.  Such supporting changes 
imply that the observed effects cannot be attributed to IFRS adoption alone.10 
Apart from the IAS Regulation and the ensuing changes in the enforcement of financial 
reporting, the FSAP brought numerous other legislative initiatives in the area of financial market 
regulation.  Among the ones geared towards securities markets were the Market Abuse Directive 
on insider trading and market manipulation, the Transparency Directive (TPD) harmonizing 
reporting and disclosure requirements,11 the Prospectus Directive regulating disclosures during 
public security offerings, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive on the provision of 
investment services across the EU, and the Takeover Directive, which provides a common 
framework for mergers and acquisitions, and takeover bids in the EU.  All these directives were 
implemented over the 2004 to 2009 period, and because they potentially improve, or at least 
affect market liquidity, they could be confounding factors in an empirical analysis of IFRS 
adoption (see also Cumming et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2013a). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  Daske et al. (2013) make similar arguments for voluntary IFRS adoptions at the firm-level. 
11  Among other things, the TPD requires EU countries to create or designate an enforcement agency that reviews 
the required information disclosures. Thus, this directive can be viewed as addressing the heterogeneous 
response among member states to the enforcement requirement of the IAS Regulation. As the TPD was 
implemented well after the IFRS mandate, it is unlikely to interfere with our analysis, which for the most part 
is centered on IFRS introduction. We confirm this claim in Table 3. The TPD however could play a role for 
our analyses in Table 6, and hence we perform a sensitivity check to gauge its influence (see footnote 43). 
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As the EU example and our discussion of the empirical challenges highlights, there are 
several potential explanations for the existence of significant capital-market effects around the 
introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting.  We broadly distinguish between four explanations: 
(i) IFRS adoption played a primary role for the observed capital-market benefits; (ii) IFRS 
introduction had capital-market benefits, but only in countries with strong institutions and legal 
systems; (iii) a combination of IFRS adoption and concurrent enforcement (and possibly other) 
changes designed to support IFRS adoption is responsible for the capital-market effects; and (iv) 
IFRS had little effect, but other institutional changes or economic shocks that are unrelated to 
financial reporting drive the observed results. 
3. Research design and data 
3.1. Identification strategy and empirical model 
We examine the sources of capital-market effects after the introduction of mandatory IFRS 
reporting using a large international panel dataset with quarterly firm-level observations.  We 
focus on stock market liquidity as proxy of economic outcomes for three reasons.  First, theory 
predicts that enhancing corporate transparency reduces information asymmetries in financial 
markets and hence increases market liquidity (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 2001).  Second, we can measure liquidity reliably over relatively 
short intervals.  Third, liquidity is less anticipatory in nature than other economic constructs like 
cost of capital or firm value.12  These features are critical to our identification strategy as they 
allow us to measure liquidity changes around key events, i.e., when the first IFRS reports 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  While investors likely adjust market valuations or cost of capital estimates as soon as their expectations about 
future corporate transparency change, liquidity is less anticipatory because investors primarily worry about 
adverse selection and, hence, the level of transparency at the time they trade. It is of course possible that 
investors anticipate when buying shares that future improvements in transparency will reduce adverse selection 
at the time they sell. But this anticipatory effect is likely small. 
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become available or when enforcement changes take effect, while controlling for general trends 
as well as other economic and regulatory shocks to liquidity over the sample period. 
We illustrate our identification strategy and the coding of the main variables in Figure 1.  
Our empirical design has three key elements: variation in IFRS reporting, variation in 
enforcement changes, and the set of fixed effects.  We describe each element in turn.  First, we 
have variation in IFRS reporting across countries, firms, and over time.  Our global sample 
comprises observations from countries that require IFRS reporting, mostly for fiscal years ending 
on or after December 31st, 2005 (firms #1 and #2 in Figure 1), and from countries without an 
IFRS mandate (firms #5 and #6).  In addition, the sample includes firms that voluntarily 
switched to IFRS before it became mandatory (firm #4).13  Including voluntary adopters in the 
analysis allows us to examine liquidity effects for a set of companies that does not have to 
change accounting standards when the IFRS mandate comes into effect.  However, voluntary 
adopters are affected by other changes to the financial reporting system that apply to all firms 
and are meant to support IFRS adoption (e.g., stricter enforcement).  As another source of 
variation, we include firms that do not have to report under IFRS (firm #3).14  We identify firms 
that do not report under IFRS after the mandate based on the “accounting standards followed” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Voluntary adopters are drawn from Daske et al. (2013). While several countries permitted the use of IFRS in 
lieu of local GAAP even before the mandate (e.g., Germany, Russia), others did not (e.g., U.K., Canada). Not 
surprisingly, the proportions of voluntary adopters differ accordingly. To capture liquidity effects around the 
mandate, the IFRS variable does not switch to ‘1’ until after IFRS become mandatory, even if the firm already 
voluntarily reported under IFRS before that date. Coding the voluntary switch (before the mandate) with a 
separate dummy does not affect our results. Similarly, dropping voluntary IFRS adopters from the sample 
(except for the analyses in Table 5) does not change the interpretation of the results. 
14  In the EU, IFRS reporting is required for the consolidated financial statements of firms with equity securities 
traded on EU regulated markets. Firms that had only debt instruments or reported under U.S. GAAP could 
defer the application of IFRS for two more years after the initial start date of December 31st, 2005. Legal entity 
financial statements of traded firms, firms whose shares trade on non-regulated EU markets, as well as private 
firms are generally exempt from the IFRS requirement (ICAEW, 2007; Pownall and Wieczynska, 2012). 
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field in Worldscope (field 07536).15  In most countries not all firms have the same fiscal-year 
end.  As a result, firms released their first mandatory IFRS financial statements at different times 
(e.g., December 31st, 2005, vs. June 30th, 2006).  We exploit the quarterly frequency of the 
liquidity data combined with the staggered release of the initial IFRS reports by coding the 
mandatory IFRS indicator so that it takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the calendar quarter 
immediately following a firm’s first fiscal-year end under the IFRS mandate (e.g., Q1/2006 for 
firm #1 and Q3/2006 for firm #2).  Panel A of Figure 2 shows the resulting sample variation in 
the IFRS variable stemming from the initial rollout of mandatory IFRS reports.  Not surprisingly, 
first-time IFRS reports are heavily concentrated in the four quarters of 2006.16  But there is also 
further variation in the years that followed.  The staggered release of IFRS reports together with 
the inclusion of non-adopters help us control for unrelated liquidity trends and economic shocks. 
The second key element of our empirical design is data on changes in reporting 
enforcement.  We combine public sources (e.g., annual reports of national securities regulators) 
with a survey asking questions about changes in the enforcement of financial reporting over the 
sample period.  We sent the survey to national securities regulators, the technical partners at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and, in a few cases, academics.  Based on this process, we identify five 
EU member states (Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.) with substantive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  Voluntary adopters and non-adopters are clearly non-randomly selected firms. They are nevertheless useful 
benchmarks in our analysis. To mitigate concerns about these sample firms, we conduct sensitivity analyses 
that include separate fixed effects for the two types of firms and/or eliminate them from the sample. The results 
(not tabulated) are very similar to those reported and none of the inferences change. 
16 ! Because of the large number of December fiscal-year end firms the initial rollout of IFRS reports is clustered 
in Q1/2006. However, our results also obtain if we drop these firms from the sample. This is possible because 
our identification does not exclusively rely on the staggered release of the IFRS reports, but also draws upon 
the existence of non-IFRS firms in quarters (and countries) when IFRS reporting firms are present. Thus, all 
observations for which there is variation in the IFRS indicator (i.e., IFRS = 0 and IFRS = 1) within a quarter 
and the group defined by the fixed-effects structure (i.e., EU or non-EU IFRS countries in the main analysis 
and individual country in the within-country analysis) contribute to the identification of the effects.!
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changes in their enforcement of financial reporting around the time of the IFRS mandate.17  
These countries created new enforcement agencies, moved to a proactive review process for 
financial statements to ensure compliance with IFRS, tightened penalties for violating accounting 
standards, increased resources available to supervisory authorities, or made other enforcement 
changes.  The proactive review process is in some respects similar to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s comment and review process.  Given that none of the five countries had 
a risk-based, random sampling review process prior to IFRS adoption, we treat the introduction 
of proactive reviews as a key indication for a substantive shift in enforcement, but we recognize 
that it may be only one of several components.18  In addition to the five EU countries with 
bundled enforcement changes and mandatory IFRS adoption, we identify one country that 
changed enforcement before IFRS adoption (Estonia), and seven countries that did so after IFRS 
adoption but before the end of the sample period (Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Hong Kong, and Turkey).  Finally, one country (Japan) made enforcement changes over 
the sample period but has not yet adopted IFRS (see Table 1).19  In the Appendix, we provide 
details on the survey and describe institutional changes in each country with a substantive shift in 
enforcement.  Despite our best efforts, we acknowledge that the designation of a substantive shift 
in enforcement remains somewhat subjective. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  Iceland also had a substantive enforcement change around IFRS adoption, but as we lack liquidity data prior to 
2007, it does not contribute to the identification. Denmark tightened its reporting enforcement in 2005 when 
the Danish Securities Council was set-up. However, before that date, Denmark had already instituted a 
proactive review process and issued several enforcement actions under the old regime. Thus, the shift was 
perceived as more gradual and less substantive. As robustness check, we group Denmark with the five bundled 
countries and find that the results are very similar to those reported and none of the inferences change. 
18  We are not interested in proactive reviews per se. We merely treat their introduction as a proxy for substantive 
enforcement changes. While in all five countries with bundled IFRS adoption, regulators switched to proactive 
reviews, we do not maintain that this is the only change or a necessary element. For example, in the U.K., the 
switch to proactive reviews already started in 2004, but our survey and various sources indicate that the 
substantive change did not take place until the second quarter of 2005 (see the Appendix for more details). 
19  Chile is another country with substantive enforcement changes before IFRS adoption. However, the changes 
occurred during the second quarter of 2009 and were tied to the release of the initial mandatory IFRS 
statements in 2010. Thus, they occurred after our analysis. 
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We define a binary !ENF indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ for each firm 
beginning in the calendar quarter immediately following the first fiscal-year end after the 
substantive enforcement change.  The rationale for this coding is that the supervisory authorities 
review financial statements as they become available.  Thus, the effects of tighter reporting 
enforcement likely occur when firms have prepared their financial statements and submit them to 
the regulator.  To illustrate, firm #1 in Figure 1 has a fiscal-year end of December 31st and hence 
the !ENF variable is switched on beginning in Q1/2007.  Note that in this example, IFRS is not 
bundled with enforcement, so IFRS and !ENF are independently coded.  For the five bundled 
countries, IFRS and !ENF switch on at the same time and hence are identical because the 
enforcement changes were concurrent and generally tied to IFRS adoption.20  For firm #2 the 
initial annual reports under the stricter enforcement regime are not available until Q3/2007.  This 
coding implies that enforcement changes have a staggered introduction as well.  Figure 2, Panel 
B, shows the resulting sample variation from the initial rollout of substantive enforcement 
changes given the fiscal-year end distribution.  It is apparent that the enforcement shifts are also 
fairly clustered in time, largely due to their bundling with IFRS adoption.  However, we have 
some variation from Japanese firms that do not report under IFRS (contributing to the peak in 
mid-2006), as well as from firms in Sweden, Hong Kong, and Turkey (as visible in the 2008 and 
2009 peaks).  We use this variation to estimate liquidity effects around substantive changes in 
enforcement without simultaneous IFRS adoption. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  Thus, to reflect bundling, the !ENF variable in Finland and the U.K. is not set to ‘1’ until after 12/31/2005 
(mirroring the IFRS variable), even though the substantive enforcement changes occurred earlier in 2005. See 
also footnote 47. In our main analyses, we code !ENF in such a way that it applies only to IFRS adopting 
firms and not to firms reporting under local GAAP as there is anecdotal evidence that the newly created 
enforcement regimes did not target non-IFRS firms. When we relax this assumption (in Table 6) or re-run the 
main analyses with !ENF covering all local firms we find no liquidity improvements around enforcement 
changes for firms that do not adopt IFRS. This finding is consistent with the anecdotal evidence. Irrespective of 
this coding choice, our main inferences regarding the liquidity effects of IFRS adoption remain unchanged. 
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Given the variation described for the first two elements above, we can introduce an 
extensive set of fixed effects to control for various sources of observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity in liquidity.  This fixed-effects structure is the third element of our empirical 
design.  It is intended to minimize correlated omitted variable (and related endogeneity) 
concerns.  In our main specification, we include country, industry, and separate quarter-year 
fixed effects for three groups: the EU countries, non-EU but IFRS adoption countries, and non-
IFRS countries.21  This fixed-effects structure implies that our main analysis provides within-
group estimates for the key variables of interest.  That is, the quarter-year fixed effects eliminate 
all common shocks to liquidity within each of the three country groups in a given quarter, and 
the average liquidity effect is estimated using solely within-group variation in the variables of 
interest across firms (i.e., the IFRS and !ENF indicators).  The choice of the three country 
groups is motivated by two reasons.  First, prior research shows that the capital-market effects 
around IFRS adoption are concentrated in the EU (e.g., Daske et al., 2008).  Second, non-IFRS 
countries could exhibit different liquidity trends than IFRS countries. 
As explained above, our dataset exhibits within-country variation of when the IFRS mandate 
and the enforcement changes apply to a given firm.  In addition, the dataset contains non-IFRS 
adopters.  Thus, we can employ an even more extensive fixed-effects structure and introduce 
separate quarter-year fixed effects for each country.  This specification amounts to within-
country estimation in that it only uses variation stemming from the staggered release of the first 
reports under the IFRS mandate (and/or the new enforcement regime) as well as the variation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21  An alternative specification would be to run separate regressions for each group. The main difference is that we 
do not impose the same coefficients on the firm-specific control variables in the liquidity model for each 
group. In our view, this is not a major restriction and, in fact, pooling all observations could help the estimation 
of the liquidity model. That said, we also provide results eliminating observations from non-IFRS benchmark 
countries (see Table 3). Furthermore, we obtain similar results and the same inferences when we estimate 
separate regressions for each of the three groups (not tabulated). 
 20!
due to non-IFRS adopters in a given country and quarter.  The specification controls for arbitrary 
liquidity shocks to all firms in a given country and quarter, including liquidity effects due to 
regulatory changes that apply to all firms.  Such changes could stem from the EU directives in 
the FSAP.  These directives are introduced throughout the EU and apply to all firms traded on a 
country’s regulated markets beginning on a specific date.  Thus, their effects are absorbed by the 
country-specific quarter-year fixed effects.  Alternatively, their effects can be controlled for with 
separate indicator variables marking the quarters when the directives enter into force (see also 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010, 2013; Christensen et al., 2013a). 
For omitted factors to create spurious results in the within-country analysis, they would have 
to be correlated with the timing of IFRS introduction and/or enforcement changes across 
countries as well as the fiscal-year end distribution in these countries.  Thus, the within-country 
analysis should be able to separate liquidity effects due to changes in financial reporting (e.g., 
IFRS, reporting enforcement or other changes to reporting system) from liquidity effects that are 
unrelated to financial reporting.  At the same time, the within-country estimation is very 
demanding and eliminates a substantial amount of variation. 22   We therefore use this 
specification as a sensitivity check only. 
Combining the three elements of our empirical strategy, we obtain the following generic 
regression model (without firm and time subscripts): 
Liq = "0 + "1 IFRS + # "j Controlsj + # "i Fixed Effectsi + $. (1) 
The dependent variable, Liq, stands for the liquidity proxies.  IFRS is a binary variable 
marking firm-quarters with IFRS reporting after the mandate.  Controlsj denotes a set of firm-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  As one could argue that the within-country analysis risks “throwing out the baby with the bathwater,” we 
explore several alternative fixed-effect structures in the sensitivity analyses (see Section 4.1). 
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level control variables.  Fixed Effectsi represents country, industry, and separate quarter-year 
fixed effects for the corresponding groups.  As mandatory IFRS adoption and enforcement 
changes are regulatory initiatives that occur at the country level in specific time periods, we draw 
statistical inferences based on two-way clustered standard errors by country and calendar 
quarter.23  Eq. (1) does not include explanatory variables for concurrent changes in enforcement 
(!ENF) or for the level of regulatory quality.  However, in subsequent tests, we sequentially 
expand Eq. (1) to allow the estimation of separate IFRS liquidity effects conditional on EU 
membership, the strength of the regulatory environment, and (bundled) changes in enforcement.  
Figure 3 illustrates our research strategy, which aims to distinguish between the four potential 
explanations for the observed liquidity effects after IFRS adoption.  Panel B of Table 1 reports 
the binary indicators used in these tests to create non-overlapping subsets of sample countries.  
For instance, when we distinguish between EU countries that bundled the IFRS mandate with 
substantive enforcement changes, the remaining EU countries, and the IFRS adoption countries 
outside the EU, we estimate the following model (see also the second panel under the ‘Test I’ 
heading in Figure 3): 
Liq = "0 + "1 IFRSEU_ENF + "2 IFRSEU_nonENF + "3 IFRSnon-EU + # "j Controlsj + 
 # "i Fixed Effectsi + $. (2) 
In this model, we replace the single IFRS indicator from Eq. (1) with three separate (non-
overlapping) indicators for (i) the EU countries that switched to IFRS and, at the same time, 
implemented substantive enforcement changes (IFRSEU_ENF), (ii) the remaining EU countries 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  As our panel data cover a relatively short period, clustering by calendar quarter can be problematic and lead to 
biased standard errors (Petersen, 2009, p. 460). We therefore check that one-way clustering at the country level 
produces similar results and inferences. Furthermore, clustering by 18 economic regions (e.g., Southern 
Europe, Central Europe, etc.) instead of by individual countries or clustering at the firm level does not change 
the interpretation of our tests (although it changes the significance levels of some coefficients of interest). 
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without concurrent enforcement changes (IFRSEU_nonENF), and (iii) the non-EU countries that also 
switched to IFRS reporting (IFRSnon-EU).  With this coding, we can directly compare the total 
liquidity effects of mandatory IFRS adoption across the three groups.  The total group effects are 
easier to interpret than an interaction model that estimates the incremental effects of IFRS and 
enforcement changes using main effects and interaction terms.24  Apart from creating the false 
appearance of an ANOVA with two independently assigned treatments, this approach and, in 
particular, the use of a single label for the enforcement changes (!ENF) masks the fact that, 
unlike IFRS adoption, the enforcement changes across countries are not necessarily identical or 
even similar (see Appendix and Section 4.4). 
3.2. Sample and variable description 
Our sample period starts in the first quarter of 2001 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2009.  
We include all firm-quarter observations for which we have the necessary liquidity and control 
variable data in Datastream and accounting standards information in Worldscope to estimate our 
basic regression model stated in Eq. (1).  The sample comprises up to 35 IFRS treatment 
countries, of which 24 belong to the EU, and 21 benchmark countries.25  Table 1, Panel A, 
provides an overview of the sample composition by country, using the bid-ask spread sample as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24  As a technical matter, we can recast our model in Eq. (2) as an interaction model that is econometrically 
equivalent and yields exactly the same results and inferences. See Christensen et al. (2013b). To illustrate, a 
version of Eq. (2) without distinction between EU and non-EU countries using the interaction approach is: Liq 
= "0 + "1 IFRS + "2 !ENF + "3 IFRS*!ENF + # "j Controlsj + # "i Fixed Effectsi + $. Here, "1 reflects the 
liquidity effects in IFRS countries without enforcement, "2 the separate enforcement effects (without IFRS 
reporting), and "3 the incremental liquidity effects in IFRS countries with (bundled or non-concurrent) 
enforcement changes (i.e., incremental to "1 and "2; thus the total effect relative to the benchmark sample is "1 
+ "2 + "3). Results from this simplified model are consistent with our findings. We find that the IFRS 
coefficient "1 is insignificant, the enforcement coefficient "2 is negative and highly significant, and the 
interaction term "3 is negative but insignificant for the liquidity factor and significant for spreads. Christensen 
et al. (2013b) tabulates the results. This specification is less discriminating with respect to various treatments 
than ‘Test IV’ in Figure 3 and the corresponding analyses in Table 6. 
25  We do not have the necessary data for several EU member states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, and 
Romania). At the same time, we include Iceland and Norway in the EU sample because they belong to the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and adopt all EU capital market directives. The results are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of these countries. 
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the basis.  The sample comprises 613,752 firm-quarter observations.  We exclude firms in IFRS 
countries that follow U.S. GAAP and firms with a U.S. cross-listing, which until 2007 meant 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.  In addition, we eliminate firms trading on unregulated EU markets 
(e.g., the Alternative Investment Market AIM in London) as EU directives do not necessarily 
apply to them, drop very small firms with average market values below US$ 5 million, and 
require benchmark countries to have at least 20 firms.26 
Panel A also lists the dates when IFRS reporting became mandatory, the calendar quarter 
during which the substantive change in enforcement took place (as detailed in the Appendix), 
and the Regulatory Quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2009).  The latter index measures a 
government’s ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations (as of 2003, i.e., 
before mandatory IFRS adoption).  Higher values indicate better regulatory quality.  In the last 
column, we report the number of firm-quarter observations from firms that voluntarily adopted 
IFRS before the mandate.  Even though included throughout the analyses, we use these firms 
specifically to disentangle standards effects from enforcement effects in some of the tests that 
follow.  Panel B of Table 1 lists the country-level coding of the binary indicator variables we use 
to build non-overlapping subsets of the sample that allow the estimation of total liquidity effects 
and comparisons across groups of countries and firms. 
We present results for two liquidity measures.  First, the Bid-Ask Spread is conceptually 
close to the desired construct and commonly used in empirical research to capture information 
asymmetry (e.g., Stoll, 1978; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Glosten and Harris, 1988).  We 
obtain the closing bid and ask prices for each day and compute the daily quoted percentage 
spread as the difference between the two prices divided by the mid-point.  We then take the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26  Unregulated markets, such as the AIM, are the reason why the U.K., which typically ranks among the largest 
sample countries in international studies, has fewer observations than countries like Australia or Hong Kong. 
 24!
median daily spread over the quarter for a given firm.  Second, to address measurement concerns 
about the spreads (e.g., because they are taken at the close of day when trading is low), we 
compute three more proxies for market liquidity and create an aggregate variable.  Zero Returns 
is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading days per 
quarter.  It is more widely available than spreads because it relies just on returns data.  We 
compute Price Impact as the quarterly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., 
daily absolute stock returns divided by US$ trading volume).27  Total Trading Costs are an 
estimate of the total round trip transaction costs (including bid-ask spreads, commissions, and 
implicit costs from short-sale constraints or taxes) based on a quarterly time-series regression of 
daily stock returns on the aggregate market returns (Lesmond et al., 1999).28  For parsimony, we 
follow Daske et al. (2008) and Lang et al. (2012) and aggregate the four liquidity proxies into a 
single Liquidity Factor employing factor analysis, and use the factor scores from the first (and 
only) factor with an Eigenvalue greater than one as dependent variable.29 
In terms of firm-level control variables, we follow prior literature and include firm size 
using the market value of equity, share turnover, and return variability (Chordia et al., 2000; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  We estimate the liquidity regressions in a log-linear form using the 
natural logarithm of the dependent variables and the control variables, and lag the control 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27  To avoid the misclassification of days with no or low trading activity (i.e., days potentially yielding a price 
impact of zero), we omit zero-return days from the computation of the quarterly medians. 
28  This measure is based on the logic that informed investors do not trade when the cost of trading exceeds the 
value of new information. Since private information is not observable, we use log-likelihood estimation to 
extract a proxy of total trading costs from a system of equations employing a panel of firms’ daily stock returns 
and equal-weighted local market index returns. Following Lesmond (2005), we require at least 24 daily returns 
and 20 percent of the daily returns to be different from zero per firm-quarter. To reduce measurement error, we 
eliminate estimates below one basis point (see the appendix in Daske et al., 2008, for details on the estimation). 
29  Using mean quarterly spreads and price impact instead of medians in the analyses or to form the liquidity 
factor does not affect the inferences from our tests. 
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variables by four quarters.30  Price and volume data are from Datastream.31  We truncate all 
continuous variables at the first and 99th percentile. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the continuous variables used in the analyses, and in 
the table notes we provide further details on the variable measurement.  The median firm is 
reasonably liquid with a bid-ask spread equal to one percent of share price.  At the same time, 
there is substantial variation in liquidity across firms as indicated by the standard deviation.  As 
the liquidity variables are negatively skewed, we use log-transformed measures in the regression 
analyses.  All four individual liquidity measures are highly correlated with Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.47 to 0.80.  They are also well represented by the aggregate liquidity 
factor with correlations of 0.73 or better.  For brevity, in the analyses that follow we tabulate and 
discuss only the results for Bid-Ask Spreads, which conceptually are the most appealing measure, 
and the Liquidity Factor, which aggregates the individual proxies.  The table further shows that 
liquidity increases with firm size and share turnover, and decreases with more volatile returns. 
4. Liquidity effects of IFRS adoption and substantive changes in enforcement 
4.1. Test I: IFRS adoption globally and in the EU bundled with enforcement changes 
In our first set of tests, we confirm that capital-market effects around IFRS adoption are 
concentrated in the EU.  Next, we analyze whether unrelated economic shocks and other 
regulatory changes in the EU could explain the findings and whether liquidity effects differ 
across countries with and without concurrent enforcement changes.  Table 3 presents the results 
of this analysis, and reports coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics from estimating 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30  In the Zero Return regressions we do not log transform the dependent variable. Because the Liquidity Factor 
can assume negative values we add one to the raw score before computing the natural logarithm. 
31  Our primary source of bid-ask spread data is Datastream. To increase sample size in some of the smaller EU 
countries (i.e., Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Slovenia) we complement this data with spreads 
from Bloomberg. For U.S. firms, we add spread data from CRSP because Datastream does not have this data in 
the early years of our sample period. Doing so does not materially affect the results. 
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variations of Eq. (1) with bid-ask spreads (Panel A) and the liquidity factor (Panel B) as the 
dependent variable.  As is common for liquidity models and given the extensive fixed-effects 
structure, the explanatory power of the regressions is high (between 65 and 80 percent).  All 
firm-specific control variables are significant and have the expected signs. 
In Model 1 of Table 3, we estimate Eq. (1) and include a separate set of quarter-year fixed 
effects for IFRS and non-IFRS countries.  This structure allows for different trends in liquidity as 
well as arbitrary shocks to liquidity across IFRS and non-IFRS countries.  The IFRS coefficient 
is insignificant in the bid-ask spread and liquidity factor regressions, suggesting that across all 
countries IFRS adoption has little systematic impact on market liquidity.32 
In Model 2, we replace the single IFRS indicator variable with two non-overlapping binary 
indictors, one for all EU member states (IFRSEU) and one for the remaining IFRS adoption 
countries (IFRSnon-EU).  In addition, we introduce separate quarter-year fixed effects for EU 
member states, expanding the fixed effects structure to capture flexible time trends across the 
three groups (i.e., EU, other IFRS countries, and benchmark countries).  In line with prior 
evidence, mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with a significant reduction in liquidity, but 
only in the EU and not in the remaining IFRS adoption countries.  Finding heterogeneous results 
and, in particular, that the liquidity effects are limited to the EU already suggests that IFRS 
adoption alone is not the primary driver of the observed capital-market effects.  But the finding 
does not discriminate between the other three explanations.  The liquidity effects in the EU could 
be explained by stronger legal and regulatory quality in the EU compared to the rest of the IFRS 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32  If we cluster the standard errors by firm, the IFRS coefficient becomes significant in the liquidity factor 
regression. Yet, this (average) finding is misleading and masks that the effect is driven by EU observations 
and, more specifically, by countries with concurrent enforcement changes. See also Christensen et al. (2013b). 
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countries, by other regulatory changes such as those following the FSAP, or by bundling IFRS 
adoption with substantive enforcement changes in some EU countries, but not outside the EU. 
To rule out explanation (iv), other regulatory changes and arbitrary shocks to liquidity, we 
include explicit control variables for the introduction of several key directives in the FSAP, 
namely the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), the Transparency Directive (TPD), the Takeover 
Directive (Takeover), the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), and the Prospectus 
Directive (Prospectus).  Alternatively, we re-estimate the model with separate quarter-year fixed 
effects for every country.  This design controls for arbitrary liquidity shocks common to all firms 
in a given country and quarter and uses only within-country variation in IFRS adoption across 
firms as well as in firms’ fiscal-year ends to identify the IFRS variables (see also Figure 1).33  
Consistent with Christensen et al. (2013a), the coefficients on MAD and TPD are significantly 
negative, while the other EU directives are insignificant (see Table 3).  However, the IFRSEU 
coefficient is not affected by the additional controls in Model 3 and only slightly smaller in 
magnitude for the bid-ask spreads in Model 4.  Thus, it is unlikely that the five directives or other 
economic shocks unrelated to financial reporting are responsible for the observed liquidity 
effects around the IFRS mandate, despite the fact that some of these directives came into force at 
around the same time as the switch to mandatory IFRS reporting. 
To gauge the extent to which our findings are sensitive to the inclusion of observations from 
benchmark countries, we next eliminate firms from non-IFRS countries.  The results remain 
largely unchanged, regardless of whether we use two separate quarter-year fixed effects (Model 
5) or within-country estimation (not tabulated).  We obtain similar results when we limit the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33  Because EU directives enter into force as of a given date and affect all sample firms in a country at the same 
time, we cannot separately introduce indicators for the directives once we apply within-country estimation. 
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sample to EU firms only or when we drop (one-by-one) the three largest treatment countries in 
the EU from the sample (i.e., the U.K., Germany, and France). 
In the last two columns of the table we explore explanation (iii) and compare the liquidity 
effects in countries in which IFRS and the enforcement changes are bundled to the effects in 
countries without such bundling.  Specifically, in Models 6 and 7, we estimate Eq. (2), which 
distinguishes between EU countries that bundled the IFRS mandate with enforcement changes 
(IFRSEU_ENF), the remaining EU countries (IFRSEU_nonENF), and IFRS adoption countries outside 
the EU (IFRSnon-EU).  Liquidity increases significantly only in those EU countries that bundle 
IFRS adoption with enforcement changes.  No such increase is present in the other EU countries 
without concurrent enforcement changes, or outside the EU.  The IFRSEU_nonENF coefficient is 
insignificant in all specifications and much smaller than the IFRSEU_ENF coefficient.34  Thus, 
consistent with explanation (iii), the results suggest that concurrent changes in reporting 
enforcement (or other factors associated with these enforcement changes) play a crucial role for 
the liquidity benefits around IFRS introduction. 
Based on the coefficient estimates for the liquidity factor, liquidity improves in the five 
countries with bundled enforcement between 18 and 23 percent relative to pre-IFRS liquidity 
levels.35  To further gauge the economic magnitude, we translate these percentages into annual 
trading cost savings for the mean and median sample firm.  We multiply the estimated trading 
cost reductions with the yearly dollar trading volume per firm and then aggregate over firms.  
For bid-ask spreads, the mean (median) cost savings are on the order of US$ 0.35 (0.11) to 0.45 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34  The IFRSEU_ENF coefficient is different from the other two IFRS coefficients at a 5% level or better, except for 
spreads using within-country estimation when the difference is close to being significant (11%; two-sided). 
35  We compute the percentage effects for the liquidity factor as (e-0.259 – 1) = -0.23 and (e-0.195 – 1) = -0.18. The 
individual liquidity proxies are slightly more dispersed and produce percentage effects of -0.35 to -0.17 (bid-
ask spreads), -0.25 to -0.22 (total trading costs), and -0.13 to -0.14 (zero returns). The coefficients in the price 
impact regressions are insignificant. 
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(0.15) million, or 0.09 (0.06) to 0.11 (0.07) percent of market value per firm and year.  For total 
round-trip trading costs, the mean (median) savings lie in the range of US$ 1.2 (0.23) to 1.5 
(0.29) million, or 0.17 (0.13) to 0.22 (0.16) percent of market value.  These numbers are clearly 
economically significant, in particular when considering the recurring nature of the savings, but 
at the same time not too large to be implausible.  At the same time, these savings need to be 
interpreted cautiously as the analysis is limited to liquidity and does not consider any costs from 
IFRS adoption or substantive enforcement changes.  Thus, the analysis is silent on the net effects 
of the regulatory changes but shows that the switch to IFRS alone is unlikely to explain the 
observed liquidity changes around IFRS adoption. 
In additional tests (not tabulated), we find further support for the importance of enforcement 
changes by examining cross-sectional differences among the five IFRSEU_ENF countries.  
Presumably, if IFRS reporting played a primary role, we should find bigger effects in countries 
for which the switch to IFRS resulted in bigger changes in the accounting standards.  Using the 
Bae et al. (2008) measure for accounting differences between IFRS and pre-existing GAAP, we 
find the opposite result.  That is, the liquidity effects are generally larger in countries with 
smaller GAAP differences, which is inconsistent with explanation (i).  But as the cross-sectional 
variation is limited to five countries, this result should be interpreted cautiously. 
We also assess the sensitivity of the results to the fixed-effects structure of our empirical 
models.  In particular, the within-country specification severely restricts the variation that is used 
to estimate the effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes, and risks “throwing out the 
baby with the bathwater.”  We therefore explore several alternative fixed-effect structures that 
replace the (demanding) country-quarter fixed effects, but still tighten the specification relative 
to the three-trend base model: first, to control for firm-specific time-invariant variables, we 
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replace country- and industry-fixed effects with firm-fixed effects.36  Second, since the liquidity 
models might vary across countries (and over time), we interact the firm-level control variables 
with country fixed effects (e.g., country*size).  Third, we add separate quarter-year fixed effects 
for developed markets to allow for the possibility that emerging and developed economies 
exhibit different liquidity trends.  Fourth, we include separate size coefficients in each quarter 
(size*year-quarter) to accommodate liquidity shocks that affect large firms differently than small 
firms.  Finally, we address the concern about overstated t-statistics that can arise in difference-in-
differences regressions with a large number of observations from the same firm (Bertrand et al., 
2004).  For each firm, we collapse the time-series into a single observation pre- and post-IFRS 
by computing means.  None of these variations (not tabulated) materially alter the results, and 
the inferences remain unchanged. 
Finally, to assess the influence of differences in sample size across countries, we re-run the 
analyses after dropping sample countries with fewer than 500 firm-quarter observations or 
estimating weighted least squares regressions with the inverse of the number of firm-quarters per 
country as weights (i.e., giving less weight to countries with many observations).  In both cases 
the inferences from our tests are not affected. 
4.2. Test II: Effect of regulatory quality on IFRS adoption and enforcement changes 
Our second set of tests examines whether the liquidity effects in the five EU countries stem 
from explanation (ii) and simply reflect pre-existing differences in the level of enforcement or in 
regulatory quality.  The five countries with concurrent enforcement changes are all countries 
with relatively strong legal systems and a proven track record of implementing regulation (see 
Table 1).  Thus, one could argue that our results merely mirror prior work showing that capital-
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36  Introducing firm-fixed effects is equivalent to estimating a specification in changes. The identification comes 
solely from within-firm variation in the variables of interest, i.e., changes over time. 
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market effects around IFRS adoption are concentrated in such economies and that the lack of 
effects in countries without bundled enforcement changes could be due to the fact that this latter 
group also includes countries of low regulatory quality.  To disentangle enforcement changes and 
pre-existing differences in legal and regulatory systems, we expand our regression model to 
account for the role that regulatory quality (and other institutional proxies) plays for the liquidity 
effects around IFRS adoption, and report results in Table 4. 
First, in Model 1, we split all treatment sample countries (EU and non-EU) into two groups 
based on the sample median of the regulatory quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2009).  We 
then estimate the liquidity effects of IFRS adoption in high (IFRSHigh) and low (IFRSLow) 
regulatory quality countries using two non-overlapping indicator variables (see Table 1, Panel 
B).  We find a negative but insignificant association between IFRS adoption and both liquidity 
variables in countries with high regulatory quality.  The coefficient on IFRS adoption in low 
regulatory quality countries is insignificant.  Thus, a simple sample split into countries with high 
and low regulatory quality does not generate findings similar to those in Table 3. 
Next, we exploit the variation in regulatory quality among the EU countries that do not 
bundle IFRS adoption with substantive changes in reporting enforcement, and condition the 
analysis on both regulatory quality and EU membership.  That is, aside from the five countries 
with bundled enforcement changes (IFRSEU_ENF) we form the following subgroups: EU countries 
with high regulatory quality but without change in reporting enforcement at the time of IFRS 
adoption (IFRSEU_nonENF_High), EU countries with low regulatory quality (IFRSEU_nonENF_Low), and 
the same two groups for non-EU countries (IFRSnon-EU_High and IFRSnon-EU_Low).  The coefficient 
on IFRSEU_nonENF_High is of particular interest, because it lets us separate the levels effect of 
regulatory quality, which should affect all countries with high regulatory quality (i.e., both 
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IFRSEU_ENF and IFRSEU_nonENF_High), from the changes effect, which should only be present in the 
countries with concurrent enforcement changes (IFRSEU_ENF). 
In Models 2 and 3 of Table 4, we present the main variables of interest using the three-trend 
fixed effects structure and, alternatively, within-country estimation.  Throughout, the IFRSEU_ENF 
coefficient is significantly negative.  Moreover, it is significantly smaller in magnitude (i.e., 
more negative) than the coefficients for any other subgroup, except in one case (comparing 
IFRSEU_ENF and IFRSEU_nonENF_Low), which is likely lack of power considering that IFRSEU_ENF is 
significantly larger than IFRSEU_nonENF_High in all instances.  For the bid-ask spreads, all the other 
IFRS coefficients are small in magnitude and never significantly negative.  We find the same 
results for the liquidity factor, except for the last model, in which the IFRSEU_nonENF_High 
coefficient is significantly negative. 
With respect to the role of IFRS adoption, it is particularly noteworthy that the liquidity 
effects in EU countries with high regulatory quality but without concurrent enforcement changes 
are generally indistinguishable from zero.  But even if they were significantly negative (as in 
Model 3 for the liquidity factor), this result does not imply an IFRS effect.  It could also reflect 
smaller or more gradual changes in enforcement that were not viewed and coded as substantive 
(i.e., !ENF=0).  Denmark is such a case (see footnote 17).  Consistent with this explanation, 
IFRSEU_nonENF_High is smaller if we drop Denmark from the sample or reclassify it as having a 
substantive change.  Moreover, there are no liquidity benefits outside the EU, even in countries 
with strong legal institutions and high regulatory quality.37  The IFRSnon-EU_High coefficient is 
close to zero and economically insignificant, especially for the liquidity factor, and hence it is 
not a matter of power.  Thus, the findings in Table 4 are inconsistent with the interpretation that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37  We do not have an explanation for why the IFRSnon-EU_Low coefficient is significantly positive in the within-
country estimation. 
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IFRS adoption yields positive liquidity effects as long as the standards are enforced (properly).  
Countries with strong legal systems and high regulatory quality are expected to enforce IFRS 
properly.  But that being the case, it is difficult to explain why we do not see significant liquidity 
effects around IFRS adoption in these countries.  For instance, in a country like Australia, which 
historically has an enforcement regime similar to the U.K. and therefore, one would think, 
reasonable enforcement mechanisms for IFRS (but no concurrent enforcement change), we do 
not observe significant liquidity effects around IFRS adoption. 
In additional tests (not tabulated), we confirm that the findings in Table 4 do not depend on 
the specific partitioning variable.  We repeat the analyses with various alternative proxies for a 
country’s institutional strength: the code law versus common law distinction, the differences 
between national GAAP and IFRS (Bae et al., 2008), the Kaufmann et al. (2009) rule of law 
index, an aggregate measure of reporting incentives,38 a country-level measure of earnings 
management (Leuz et al., 2003), and the anti-self dealing index from Djankov et al. (2006).  For 
each of these variables, the results are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
Moreover, when we compare the means (medians) of these institutional variables in the EU 
countries with bundled enforcement changes to the means (medians) in the remaining high 
regulatory quality countries in the EU (without such enforcement changes), none of the 
differences are statistically significant.  The two groups of countries do not differ materially in 
terms of the level of institutional strength or regulatory quality.  Thus, it is difficult to argue that 
countries in the IFRSEU_ENF group implement and enforce IFRS more rigorously than countries in 
the IFRSEU_nonENF_High group. 
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38  We follow Daske et al. (2013) and first estimate individual firms’ reporting incentives using factor analysis to 
extract a single factor based on several firm characteristics (size, leverage, return on assets, book-to-market, 
closely held shares, and foreign sales). We then compute the country-level mean incentives score, which we 
use to partition the treatment sample into above and below median reporting incentives countries. 
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In sum, the results so far largely rule out explanations (i), (ii), and (iv).  The results are 
generally supportive of explanation (iii) and suggest changes in enforcement as a possible 
confounding factor for the liquidity effects around IFRS adoption.  However, the findings do not 
imply that IFRS adoption plays no role.  The switch to IFRS and the change in enforcement 
could be complements and jointly contribute to the liquidity effects. 
4.3. Test III: Enforcement changes and voluntary IFRS adopters 
Our third set of tests attempts to shed further light on the roles of IFRS adoption and 
concurrent enforcement changes using variation within the five EU countries for which the two 
events are bundled.  We exploit the fact that some firms already reported under IFRS on a 
voluntary basis when IFRS became mandatory (i.e., EU firms that switched to IFRS before 2005 
like firm #4 in Figure 1).  For these firms, mandatory IFRS reporting does not imply a substantial 
change in the accounting standards.  Yet, voluntary IFRS adopters are affected by concurrent 
enforcement changes.  Thus, we analyze whether the liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate 
are different for voluntary adopters in countries with concurrent enforcement changes versus 
voluntary adopters in countries without such changes. 
Towards this end, we split the IFRSEU_ENF and IFRSEU_nonENF coefficients from Eq. (2) into 
non-overlapping binary indicators for voluntary (vol_IFRSEU_ENF and vol_IFRSEU_nonENF) and 
first-time mandatory adopters (man_IFRSEU_ENF and man_IFRSEU_nonENF).  The regression 
models are very similar to those in our main specification in Table 3, except that we add a fixed 
effect for voluntary IFRS firms (i.e., an indicator variable set to ‘1’ if an EU firm voluntarily 
adopts IFRS at any point before the mandate).  This variable controls for all (time-invariant) 
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differences in liquidity between voluntary adopters and the other firms in the sample, which is 
important considering that the former group is a self-selected subset.39 
Table 5 reports results using the three-trend fixed effects structure (Model 1) and within-
country estimation (Model 2).  Consistent with Table 3, we find that liquidity increases around 
the time of the IFRS mandate for voluntary IFRS adopters, but only in the five EU countries with 
concurrent enforcement changes.  That is, for both liquidity variables the vol_IFRSEU_ENF 
coefficient is significantly negative and different from the (insignificant) vol_IFRSEU_nonENF 
coefficient.  We also note that the magnitude of the liquidity effects for voluntary and mandatory 
adopters in countries with concurrent enforcement changes are similar in most cases and 
statistically not different from each other (i.e., we cannot reject the null that vol_IFRSEU_ENF = 
man_IFRSEU_ENF).  However, if there were a joint effect from IFRS adoption and enforcement 
changes, we would predict that, ceteris paribus, mandatory adopters exhibit larger effects than 
voluntary adopters.  The results do not support this prediction.  Instead, they suggest that the 
liquidity effects primarily reflect concurrent changes in enforcement (and possibly other related 
factors in these five countries).  Even then, concurrent or prior IFRS adoption could still be a 
pre-condition for liquidity effects to occur, in which case voluntary adopters might not have seen 
liquidity increases had they not adopted IFRS in the first place.  However, we question how 
plausible this explanation is considering that the five countries had local standards, which had 
developed over a long time and, in several cases, were fairly close to IFRS (Bae et al., 2008). 
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39  In additional tests (not tabulated) we perform the analyses in Table 5 controlling for several firm attributes that 
might explain voluntary IFRS adoption (i.e., financial leverage, return on assets, book-to-market, percentage of 
closely held shares, and percentage of foreign sales); after eliminating sample countries without voluntary 
IFRS adopters (see Table 1, Panel A); dropping firms that might have adopted IFRS in anticipation of the 
mandate (i.e., in or after 2002, the year the EU Commission passed the IAS Regulation); and adding an 
indicator variable that switches on after the first voluntary IFRS report. For all these analyses, the results are 
very similar, and none of our inferences change. 
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The results in Table 5 also speak to the question of how likely it is that there are spillover or 
network effects from mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g., due to better comparability).  Daske et al. 
(2008) discuss as possible explanation that liquidity improvements for voluntary adopters in the 
year of the introduction of mandatory IFRS could stem (among other things) from network or 
comparability effects that occur when mandatory adopters shift to the same accounting 
standards.  But the evidence that the liquidity effects are present only in the countries with 
bundled enforcement changes casts doubt on the existence of widespread comparability (or 
network) effects from the IFRS mandate, at least as far as market liquidity is concerned.40 
4.4. Test IV: Separating the effects of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes 
So far, our evidence supports explanation (iii) and suggests that changes in financial 
reporting enforcement are crucial for the observed liquidity benefits.  But we cannot rule out that 
IFRS reporting (or, more generally, high-quality accounting standards) are a pre-condition to 
obtain liquidity improvements around enforcement changes.  We therefore exploit that some 
countries made changes to the enforcement of financial reporting that do not coincide with IFRS 
adoption.  For instance, Sweden and Hong Kong made substantive changes to the enforcement of 
financial reporting in 2007 and 2008, respectively, but moved to IFRS reporting in 2005.  
Similarly, Turkey made enforcement changes in 2008, but moved to IFRS in 2006.  For these 
countries, we can estimate liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate and, separately, around the 
change in enforcement (see also firms #1 to #4 in Figure 1).  Admittedly, in all those cases, IFRS 
still precedes the enforcement changes.  To speak to the question of whether enforcement 
changes result in liquidity improvements without prior IFRS adoption, we study liquidity effects 
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40  Following Daske et al. (2008), Table 7, we split the IFRS observations in the EU into observations from 
industries with a high or low proportion of voluntary IFRS adopters prior to the mandate. If positive 
externalities are present, we expect the liquidity effects for the voluntary adopters to be greater in industries 
with low prior adoption rates. We do not find evidence of such a differential reaction (results not tabulated). 
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in Japan, as it made substantive enforcement changes in 2005 but has not yet moved to IFRS 
reporting (firm #5 in Figure 1).  Japan is relevant for our analysis because it gives us a change in 
reporting enforcement for an accounting regime of arguably lower quality than IFRS.41 
We first estimate the liquidity effects around enforcement changes in EU countries that did 
not bundle them with the IFRS mandate.  There are five countries that fall in this category 
(Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, and Sweden).  We define a separate binary indicator 
variable that captures the initiation of the enforcement changes (!ENFEU).  We include this new 
variable in a regression together with IFRSEU_ENF, capturing liquidity effects in the EU countries 
with bundled IFRS adoption, and IFRSnon-EU for the remaining IFRS countries. 
Model 1 in Table 6 shows the results of this analysis.  We report results from the three-
trends fixed effects specification only because we have even less variation from fiscal-year ends 
around substantive enforcement changes than around IFRS adoption (see the time-series patterns 
in Figure 2).42  We find negative coefficients for !ENFEU, but the effect is statistically significant 
for the liquidity factor only.  For spreads, the effect is close to conventional significance levels 
even though the estimated magnitude of the liquidity effect is larger (around 16 percent versus 5 
percent for the liquidity factor).43  The IFRSEU_nonENF coefficient is not significant and indicates 
no discernible liquidity effect around IFRS introduction.  However, because there are relatively 
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41  Unlike many developed countries, Japan did not initiate a project of achieving convergence between local 
GAAP and IFRS until 2005. Hence, Japanese GAAP is arguably (more) distinct from IFRS. Consistent with 
this conjecture, Bae et al. (2008) indicate nine major areas of accounting differences. Moreover, Japanese 
financial reporting has traditionally been viewed as being of relatively low quality from an information or 
capital-markets perspective (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). 
42  Nevertheless, the results for Table 6 are very similar using within-country estimation, and if anything, slightly 
stronger than those tabulated (in particular using spreads as the dependent variable). The same holds when we 
include separate fixed effects for voluntary adopters and non-adopting firms in the analysis. 
43  In EU countries, enforcement changes after IFRS adoption could be related to the TPD (see also footnote 11). 
The TPD stipulates, among other things, that each EU country must have a supervisory authority that examines 
firms’ regulated disclosures (which includes IFRS financial statements). Thus, as a sensitivity check, we code 
!ENFEU as the earlier of either the substantive enforcement change in Table 1 or the entry-into-force of the 
TPD (not tabulated). With this coding, !ENFEU is negative and becomes strongly significant, but consistent 
with Christensen et al. (2013a) only in countries with high prior regulatory quality. 
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few observations from EU countries with asynchronous enforcement changes, except for 
Sweden, the power of this test is likely small. 
We therefore expand the analysis to substantive enforcement changes globally.  That is, 
aside from countries with bundled IFRS adoption (which all happen to be in the EU, i.e., 
IFRSEU_ENF), we separately estimate the liquidity effects around enforcement changes in all IFRS 
countries (!ENFIFRS) as well as in Japan (!ENFJapan).  In addition, we estimate a single 
coefficient for the IFRS effects in all countries without bundled enforcement changes 
(IFRSnonENF) in Model 2.  In Model 3, we distinguish between IFRS countries with and without 
substantive enforcement changes over the sample period (IFRSnonENF1 and IFRSnonENF2).  The 
latter specification allows us to assess whether the liquidity effects around IFRS adoption differ 
in countries with subsequent enforcement changes, perhaps because firms anticipate when they 
adopt IFRS that enforcement of financial reporting is going to be tighter in the future. 
As Table 6 shows, enforcement changes that occur at different times than the IFRS mandate 
are associated with a significant increase in liquidity.  The !ENFIFRS coefficient is significantly 
negative and reasonably close in magnitude to the IFRSEU_ENF coefficient.  For instance, using 
the liquidity factor, the results indicate a 16-percent increase in liquidity following the 
enforcement change, which is statistically indistinguishable from the 24 percent increase around 
the bundled effects of IFRS and enforcement changes.  The enforcement effect in Japan is also 
significantly negative.  For the liquidity factor, the effects in Japan amount to a 15 percent 
increase in liquidity and are very similar to those in IFRS countries with enforcement changes.  
However, we caution to read too much into a comparison of coefficient magnitudes, as the 
regulatory changes themselves differ across countries and are probably less comparable for 
enforcement than for IFRS adoption.  At a minimum, the results show that (prior) IFRS adoption 
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is not necessary to obtain liquidity benefits around enforcement changes.  Moreover, none of the 
IFRS coefficients in Table 6 are significant. 
Overall, we find significant liquidity effects around substantive enforcement changes when 
they are not concurrent with IFRS adoption as well as in Japan where they occur without IFRS 
reporting.  At the same time, we find no evidence of liquidity benefits around IFRS adoption 
when we estimate the effects for countries that solely adopt IFRS reporting. 
5. Conclusion 
Prior studies have documented significant capital market benefits following the introduction 
of mandatory IFRS reporting.  This paper examines the sources of those benefits.  Prior work 
shows that the effects around IFRS adoption are significantly stronger in countries with stricter 
and better functioning legal systems, and that they are stronger in the EU than in other regions of 
the world.  We argue that this evidence is consistent with several interpretations and that it is still 
an open question to what extent positive capital-market effects around mandatory IFRS adoption 
are indeed attributable to arguably improved and globally harmonized accounting standards. 
We use panel-data techniques to analyze quarterly market-liquidity data, and rely on within- 
and across-country variation in the timing of IFRS adoption and of other institutional changes to 
distinguish between several possible explanations.  Specifically, we explore whether (i) the 
switch from local GAAP to IFRS reporting played a primary role for the observed capital-market 
benefits; (ii) the IFRS mandate had capital-market benefits, but only in countries with strong 
institutions and legal enforcement; (iii) countries made enforcement (and possibly other) changes 
to support the introduction of IFRS and it is this bundle that drove the capital-market effects; or 
(iv) the effects around IFRS are spurious because other institutional changes and/or economic 
shocks unrelated to financial reporting are responsible for the observed capital-market benefits. 
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We show that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS reporting had little impact on liquidity.  
Consistent with prior work, the liquidity effects around IFRS adoption are concentrated in the 
countries of the EU.  However, we show that the observed liquidity effects are not driven by 
other EU Directives and/or unrelated economic shocks.  Thus, the effects appear to be (causally) 
driven by changes in the financial reporting environment, ruling out explanation (iv).  However, 
they could reflect IFRS adoption, concurrent changes in reporting enforcement, or other related 
improvements to the reporting system.  Next, we show that the liquidity effects are confined to 
those EU countries that made substantive changes to enforcement around the time they 
introduced IFRS.  We find no evidence of liquidity benefits in non-EU countries adopting IFRS 
even when they have strong legal systems or a strong track record of implementing regulation.  
To the extent that strong legal institutions and high regulatory quality are reasonable proxies for 
how countries enforce IFRS, our results are inconsistent with the view that mandatory IFRS 
reporting has capital-market benefits as long as the standards are (properly) enforced.  Instead, 
our results point to concurrent enforcement changes as an important candidate for an omitted 
variable in prior IFRS studies and suggest that changes in reporting enforcement play a crucial 
role for the observed liquidity effects. 
Consistent with this interpretation, we show liquidity increases for voluntary IFRS adopters 
around the time of the IFRS mandate, but only in those countries with concurrent enforcement 
changes.  This evidence is inconsistent with the notion that mandatory IFRS adoption has had 
widespread comparability (or spillover) effects, as these effects should not be confined to firms 
in a select few countries.  In addition, we analyze liquidity effects in countries where substantive 
enforcement changes occur after they adopted IFRS and in the case of Japan without a prior 
move to IFRS reporting.  For these countries, the effects of IFRS and enforcement changes are 
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potentially separable.  We find that liquidity improves after substantive changes in enforcement 
but not after IFRS adoption. 
In sum, our results support explanation (iii) and generally suggest that enforcement changes 
in a few countries play a critical role for the documented liquidity effects.  This evidence does 
not automatically imply that IFRS play no role.  It is possible that IFRS reporting was a pre-
condition for the enforcement changes to take place or, alternatively, that the liquidity effects 
would have been smaller without IFRS adoption.  The majority of our tests cannot rule out either 
possibility.  However, the results for Japan show that (prior) IFRS adoption is not a necessary 
condition to obtain liquidity benefits around substantive enforcement changes.  The sum of our 
results makes it unlikely that the change in accounting standards is the primary or even an 
important driver of the liquidity effects around IFRS adoption.  Thus, the results say more than 
‘enforcement matters’ for IFRS to have an effect.  At a minimum, our findings should make 
researchers more careful about the empirical identification and about attributing observed 
capital-market effects to the change in accounting standards, i.e., to label them as “IFRS effects.” 
In closing, several caveats are in order.  First, while our research design rules out many 
concerns about omitted variables and alternative explanations, we acknowledge that other 
changes to financial reporting (e.g., audit reforms) that are closely aligned with the concurrent 
enforcement changes could play into our findings.  If such other factors exist, they do not alter 
the main message of this study – there still is a correlated omitted variable problem around IFRS 
adoption.  But it implies that we cannot simply attribute the documented liquidity effects to 
enforcement changes either.  Second, the treatment effects in this study are estimated for 
countries that have chosen to adopt IFRS and/or to change their financial reporting enforcement.  
Due to this selection, the estimated treatment effects might not be representative for other 
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countries that have not yet elected to make such changes.  Thus, our study does not advocate for 
policy changes in other countries.  Third, our study focuses solely on market liquidity.  We need 
more research to assess whether the results extend to other (capital-market) effects.  However, 
using our identification strategy requires that the effects can be measured reliably over short 
intervals.  This feature presents a major empirical challenge to extending the analyses of this 
study to other capital-market measures that are either more anticipatory in nature or adjust 
slowly.  Finally, we note that our study does not analyze the costs of changing standards or 
enforcement, and hence is silent on the net effects of these regulatory initiatives. 
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Appendix: Details on substantive enforcement changes for select sample countries 
The information in this appendix is based on a survey that we sent out to the authority responsible 
for supervising compliance with accounting standards as well as the technical departments of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in each EU country and, in a second survey, to all national regulators in the 
remaining sample countries.44 The survey specifically asks whether and when there has been a substantive 
change in enforcement with respect to financial reporting over the 2001 to 2009 period.45 The survey also 
asked a number of related questions designed to establish how substantive the enforcement change was, 
including when the current enforcement institution was set-up, whether listed firms have to file annual 
reports with the enforcement institution, what actions the enforcement institution has taken and if so, 
when the first action was taken, as well as what enforcement mechanism was in place before the change. 
When the response indicated changes in enforcement, we engaged in follow-up correspondence and 
interviews with the respondents. We also used public sources such as the annual reports of the regulators 
to clarify the extent and timing of the enforcement change and to obtain indications of enforcement 
activities that would be consistent with a substantive enforcement change.46 Ultimately, however, the 
coding of substantive enforcement changes also reflects our judgment based on the available information. 
The survey was distributed electronically and as a hardcopy. We promised respondents anonymity 
and that we would not publish their answers. Hence, we can only provide a condensed summary in this 
appendix. For brevity, we limit the description of institutional changes to countries with a substantive 
change in enforcement over the 2001 to 2009 period (see also Table 1). 
The respondents of all countries described in this appendix answered ‘yes’ to the following question: 
“Would you say there has been a substantive change in the intensity of enforcement with respect to 
financial reporting in your country from 2001 to 2009?” To pinpoint the timing of the enforcement 
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44  Similar in spirit, Brown et al. (2013) also construct an enforcement index using public sources. But as their 
index is not focused on changes around IFRS adoption, we cannot use it for our purposes. 
45  While we received answers from all EU member states, the response rate of the remaining countries is only 
about 30 percent. Notably, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not answer questionnaire 
surveys and consequently we report ‘n.a.’ in Table 1 for the USA. The most significant regulatory reform in 
the U.S. over our sample period is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX includes provisions on the 
compliance with accounting standards like stronger criminal penalties for manipulating financial statements, 
and the SEC likely has intensified enforcement activities in light of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. 
However, unlike in the IFRS adopting countries, this substantial shift in enforcement occurred more gradually 
over an extended period of time, and is therefore ill suited for our research design. As a sensitivity check, we 
nevertheless code the U.S. as one of the countries with a substantive enforcement change (i.e., !ENF takes on 
the value of ‘1’ beginning in September 2002, the introduction of the main provisions of SOX). This coding 
groups the U.S. together with Japan in Table 6, and does not alter our findings. 
46  Specifically, we compare the answers to the annual reports of the local supervisory authorities, a report on 
enforcement mechanisms in Europe (FEE, 2001), and a survey conducted by the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) on the supervisory powers in the EU (CESR, 2007a). In case of discrepancies, 
we contact the national securities regulator in an attempt to resolve the issue. 
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change, we use the date that a country instigated a proactive comment and review process (or some other 
substantive procedure). Setting up a proactive comment and review process is itself material for countries 
that have not previously enforced disclosure regulation or only on a reactive basis. But it should be noted 
that it is generally only one component of the enforcement change and it is often accompanied by other 
elements such as an increase in penalties and more resources for the enforcement body. Moreover, the set 
of enforcement changes varies among countries (see Berger, 2010, for a discussion of the variation in 
enforcement within the EU). 
A1. Countries that bundled IFRS and substantive enforcement changes 
The IAS Regulation that mandates IFRS reporting for firms listed on regulated markets in the EU for 
fiscal years ending on or after December 31st, 2005, requires member states to take appropriate measures 
to ensure compliance with IFRS. Paragraph 16 of the IAS Regulation states: “A proper and rigorous 
enforcement regime is key to underpinning investors’ confidence in financial markets. Member States, by 
virtue of Article 10 of the Treaty [establishing the European Community], are required to take appropriate 
measures to ensure compliance with international accounting standards. The Commission intends to liaise 
with Member States, notably through the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), to 
develop a common approach to enforcement.” Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community states: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community.” It follows that paragraph 16 of the IAS Regulation leaves EU member 
states with significant latitude in how to enforce compliance with IFRS (CESR, 2007b). Consistent with 
countries having substantial discretion, we find that only six EU countries made substantive changes to 
the enforcement of financial reporting upon IFRS adoption. 
We note that in those six countries, the new enforcement activities were often explicitly tied to the 
release of the (first) annual reports under IFRS. As a consequence, IFRS adoption and the enforcement 
change are essentially bundled and cannot be separated, even when the date of the enforcement change 
deviates slightly from the official IFRS adoption date. Thus, we do not separately code the !ENF variable 
for those countries, but use IFRSEU_ENF instead. 
A1.1. Finland (enforcement date: 2005 Q1) 
On January 1, 2005, the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) in Finland instituted a proactive 
review and comment procedure for listed firms. There were no enforcement activities with regard to the 
compliance with accounting standards or regulation before that date. The first sanctions imposed on firms 
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were: (i) publically disclosed violations in 2006, (ii) restatements of financial statements in 2007, and (iii) 
publicly issued warnings in 2008. 
A1.2. Germany (2005 Q4) 
The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) acts as the financial regulatory 
authority for Germany. However, the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP), a private 
organization, conducts the examinations that establish whether listed firms are in compliance with 
accounting standards. The FREP was set up on July 1, 2005 and began actively monitoring compliance in 
the fourth quarter of 2005. There was no proactive enforcement of compliance with accounting standards 
prior to that date. Formally, it is voluntary for listed firms to cooperate with the FREP, which has no 
official powers. However, in case of non-compliance, the FREP can refer cases to the BaFin, which then 
takes action. In each of the first two years of its existence, the FREP reviewed about 130 firms (15% of 
German listed firms), and in approximately one third of these cases found errors and disclosed them, 
which led to significant market reactions (see Ernstberger et al., 2012, for details). In 2006, the first 
sanctions were imposed on firms by the public disclosure of errors. In addition to the aforementioned 
enforcement changes to support compliance with IFRS, Germany also elected to tighten audit regulation 
in 2005 making the German changes concurrent to IFRS adoption more comprehensive than most 
enforcement changes in other EU countries. 
A1.3. Iceland (2005 Q3) 
Iceland technically is not a member of the EU, but adopted most EU regulations in the process of 
joining the EU single market. The Registrar of Annual Accounts (RAA) is responsible for the 
enforcement of compliance with accounting standards. The RAA dedicated one staff member to carry out 
the reviews beginning in September 2005, and another staff member in August 2006. There are less than 
ten firms listed on the Iceland Stock Exchange and hence, each staff member is responsible for about five 
issuers. Prior to IFRS adoption the RAA would only perform a limited probe. The first sanctions were 
imposed in 2007, and include: (i) public disclosure of violations, (ii) restatements of financial statements, 
and (iii) changes to financial statements going forward. 
A1.4. Netherlands (2005 Q4) 
Although the Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) was not formally set up until 2006, a proactive 
comment and review process began in the last quarter of 2005. The Supervisory Financial Reporting Act 
(Wet Toezicht Finaniele Verslaggeving; Wtfv), which gives the AFM the statutory task of reviewing 
financial statements, was originally scheduled to enter into force on November 1st, 2005, but was later 
postponed until December 31st, 2006. Despite this lack of statutory support the AFM began to proactively 
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review financial reports (on a voluntary basis) upon IFRS adoption in 2005. In each of the first two years 
of its existence, the AFM reviewed around 30 firms (about 10% of publicly listed firms). The first 
sanctions were imposed in 2007, and include: (i) public disclosure of violations, (ii) restatements of 
financial statements, and (iii) changes to financial statements going forward. 
A1.5. Norway (2005 Q4) 
Norway technically is not a member of the EU, but adopted most EU regulations in the process of 
joining the EU single market. The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN) was set up on 
January 1, 2005, and listed firms were required to submit annual reports to FSAN from October 2005 on 
(Law no. 81, December 10, 2004). Before that date, the Oslo Stock Exchange was responsible for 
enforcement, but there existed no formal proactive review process. On January 19, 2005, the FSAN sent a 
letter to all listed firms, proclaiming that enforcement would be stricter going forward and provided a list 
of potential sanctions. In 2006, the FSAN reviewed around 35 firms (more than 10% of publicly listed 
firms). The first sanctions after the shift were imposed in 2006, and included: (i) public disclosure of 
errors, and (ii) changes in accounting practices going forward. In 2007, restatements were required for the 
first time, followed by criminal sanctions and monetary fines in 2008 and 2009. 
A1.6. United Kingdom (2005 Q2) 
In the U.K., the enforcement change occurred in two steps. First, the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel (FRRP) officially switched from performing only reactive reviews to proactive reviews in the year 
prior to IFRS adoption, i.e., during the first quarter of 2004 (Companies Act 2004 – Audit, Investigations 
and Community Enterprise). The reactive approach involved acting on cases brought to the FRRP’s 
attention, for instance, via complaints made by individuals, companies, or the media. Hence, under the 
reactive approach the FRRP had little choice in the cases it reviewed and only limited control over the 
matters it considered (see Brown and Tarca, 2007, for details). During the initial phase of proactive 
reviews, the FRRP adopted a so-called “broad-based” approach in selecting financial statements for 
review. In a second step, the approach was developed further, also in preparation of IFRS adoption. By 
April 2005, the FRRP had fully implemented a risk-based and random sampling method to select 
companies, industries and reporting areas that its experts considered particularly important or problematic 
(in line with the recommendations in CESR Standard No. 1). At the same time, the supervisory powers 
and resources of the FRRP were substantially expanded. The increased powers enabled the FRRP to more 
effectively liaise with other regulators and also extend its remit to interim accounts. Consistent with this 
timing, our survey and follow-up discussions with regulators and experts identify the second quarter of 
2005 as the substantive change in reporting enforcement. Even though the implementation of proactive 
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reviews began earlier, the enhanced sampling techniques and increased powers coincided with IFRS 
adoption. Thus, we classify the U.K. as bundled because all enforcement changes took place relatively 
close to IFRS adoption and several of them were directly tied to the pending IFRS mandate.47 
On a yearly basis, the FRRP proactively reviews between 200 and 300 interim or annual financial 
reports (about 15% of publicly listed firms). The number of actions varies from year to year with a 
maximum of 94 in 2006/2007. The most common sanction is demanding corrections to future financial 
statements, which companies generally undertake voluntarily. However, in every year since the FRRP 
switched to proactive reviews, it has publicly disclosed errors and imposed restatements of firms’ 
financial statements. 
A2. Countries that did not bundle IFRS and substantive enforcement changes 
We identify ten sample countries with a substantive change in enforcement independent of IFRS, six 
of which are EU member states, and eight also adopted IFRS at some point during our sample period. It is 
worth noting that the enforcement changes in the EU generally follow the recommendations in CESR 
Standard No. 1, and later the requirements of the TPD. As a result, the changes are relatively 
homogenous. The changes in Hong Kong and Japan are substantive, but distinct from the EU changes, as 
explained below. The differential timing of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes allows us to 
separately code up the IFRS and !ENF variables in our analyses. 
A2.1. Chile (non-EU country; 2009 Q2) 
The Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) is responsible for the enforcement of compliance 
with disclosure requirements. A comment and review process has existed for the entire sample period 
(with administrative fines, required restatements, and the public disclosure of violations occurring before 
2001), but it was substantially strengthened in June 2009 in anticipation of IFRS adoption. The first 
criminal sanctions under the new regime were imposed in 2011. 
A2.2. Estonia (EU member; 2003 Q4) 
The Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA) dedicated one staff member to the 
enforcement of compliance with accounting standards in October 2003. The hiring was in response to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47  To gauge the sensitivity of our results to the Q2/2005 date and our choice of bundling the enforcement change 
with IFRS adoption, we first re-run the analyses excluding all U.K. firms from the sample and find similar 
results to those reported in the main text. Second, we separate the coding of the IFRS and !ENF variables for 
the U.K. and instead treat the U.K. like the other EU countries without concurrent enforcement changes (see 
Table 6, Model 1). In this specification, !ENFEU (IFRSEU_ENF) becomes (remains) significantly negative, but 
contrary to the main tests, the magnitude of the enforcement coefficient is now larger than the IFRS coefficient 
for the remaining four bundled countries. This evidence is consistent with Q2/2005 marking an important 
enforcement shift in the U.K. and our interpretation that enforcement changes play a major role in the findings. 
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requirement in the IAS Regulation and in anticipation of IFRS reporting, but occurred more than a year 
before the IFRS mandate took effect. Less than 20 firms are listed on the Tallinn Stock Exchange. In 
2003, the first sanctions were imposed including: (i) public disclosure of errors, and (ii) restatements of 
financial statement information. 
A2.3. Hong Kong (non-EU country; adopted IFRS; 2008 Q3) 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was established on December 1, 2006 (FRC Ordinance, 
Chapter 588). Prior to that date the system was built on self-regulation with the Hong Kong Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA) responsible for enforcing compliance with accounting standards. 
In the first years of its existence, the FRC would only act reactively to complaints. The switch towards a 
proactive comments and review process did not occur until July 16, 2008. The proactive reviews focus on 
financial statements with modified audit opinions. In the last year before the regime change, the FRC only 
received six complaints. In 2009, 129 financial statements were proactively reviewed and 19 complaints 
were received. Hence, the case of Hong Kong is similar to the U.K. in that it switched from reactively to 
proactively reviewing financial reports, but in Hong Kong the switch occurred years after IFRS adoption. 
The first sanctions were imposed in 2009, when the FRC published a report on its first investigation. 
The report was forwarded to HKICPA, which in turn issued a “Disapproval Letter” to both the auditor 
and the engagement director under investigation, advising them to “exercise due care and to act with 
proper regard to the legal and professional obligations expected of them”. Even though the enforcement 
changes in Hong Kong are considered substantive, the exact procedures and sanctions are distinct from 
the changes in the EU. 
A2.4. Hungary (EU member; 2008 Q1) 
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) is responsible for enforcing compliance 
with accounting standards. The HFSA set up a team dedicated to proactively reviewing financial 
statements at the beginning of 2008. No enforcement of compliance with accounting standards took place 
prior to that date. The first sanctions were imposed in the first half of 2009, and included: (i) restatements 
of financial statement information, and (ii) changes to financial statements going forward. 
A2.5. Ireland (EU member; 2007 Q3) 
The Irish Audit and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) was incorporated in December 
2005. However, it was not given the responsibility to enforce financial reporting regulation until June 
2007. Beginning in the third quarter of 2007, the IAASA started to review half-yearly reports, and the 
first annual financial reports under the IAASA’s remit were those with a fiscal year beginning after 
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January 20, 2007. No comments and review process existed before that date, and consequently no 
sanctions were imposed on firms prior to the shift. The first sanctions occurred in 2008 when the IAASA 
directed an issuer to restate its financial statements. 
A2.6. Japan (non-EU country; did not adopt IFRS; 2005 Q3) 
On November 16, 2004, the Financial Service Authority in Japan (FSAJ) announced a series of 
measures intended to enhance enforcement of disclosure regulation. The trigger for the shift was a series 
of high-profile corporate scandals involving disclosure misconduct. The changes were designed to 
increase confidence in the Japanese disclosure system. The action plan consisted of four measures:48 (i) an 
enhanced framework for reviewing statutory disclosure documents (e.g., annual reports), (ii) improved 
auditor oversight, (iii) further development of the disclosure system including the requirement of auditors 
to certify the effectiveness of firms’ internal controls and the expansion of the administrative civil penalty 
system to include breaches of disclosure requirements, and (iv) amendments to the stock exchanges’ 
listing rules to ensure appropriate and timely disclosure of corporate information. 
A central component of the plan was the transfer of the authority to carry out inspections of statutory 
disclosure documents from the Kanto Local Finance Bureau (KLFB) to the Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission (SESC) effective in July 2005. The transfer of responsibility was a turning 
point because the KLFB had exerted little effort in the enforcement of disclosure regulation before that 
date. Overall, the changes that occurred in Japan in 2005 strengthened the enforcement of compliance 
with accounting standards and other disclosure regulation. However, the case of Japan is distinct from the 
changes in the EU and in Hong Kong in that it also includes substantive changes to audit regulation. 
A2.7. Lithuania (EU member; 2007 Q4) 
The Securities Commission of the Republic of Lithuania (LSC) was set up in February 2007, but did 
not institute a comment and review process until November 2007. The procedures for selecting and 
reviewing financial statements closely follow the principles laid out in the CESR Standard No. 1. The 
LSC can issue pecuniary penalties. Prior to 2007, Lithuania did have a formal enforcement regime, but no 
major enforcement actions were taken. The first sanctions under the new regime were imposed in 2008, 
and included: (i) public disclosure of violations, and (ii) restatements of financial statement information. 
A2.8. Luxembourg (EU member; 2009 Q4) 
The Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF) was set-up in 1945, but did not 
implement a proactive comment and review process until the fourth quarter of 2009. In 2010, CSSF 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48  For details see the Financial Services Agency’s website: http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/e20041116-1.html 
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reviewed more than one third of the listed firms, of which nearly 10% were subject to an in-depth review. 
The CSSF first required a restatement in 2011. 
A2.9. Sweden (EU member; 2007 Q3) 
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA) has been responsible for enforcing compliance 
with accounting standards since July 2007. The stock exchanges performed (reactive) reviews of annual 
accounts before that date, but the SFSA implemented a stricter review of annual and interim reports. The 
first sanctions under the new regime were imposed in 2008, and included: (i) public disclosure of 
violations, and (ii) changes to financial statements going forward. 
A2.10. Turkey (non-EU member; 2008 Q1) 
The Capital Market’s Board of Turkey (CMBT) has been responsible of enforcing compliance with 
accounting standards since 1999; however, a risk-based proactive review process was not implemented 
until the first quarter of 2008. The changes in 2008 were implemented with the assistance of AFM, the 
Dutch enforcement institution, and therefore closely follow the recommendations of CESR in the EU. 
Two main components were implemented: (i) a risk based supervision system, and (ii) a new Financial 
Reporting Supervision Group within the CMBT to increase the effectiveness of the enforcement of 
financial reporting requirements. In addition the CMBT staff received extensive technical training on 
IFRS. 
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Figure 1: Illustrating the Identification Strategy for the Liquidity Effects of Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Substantive Enforcement Changes 
 
 
The figure illustrates our identification strategy for the two main variables of interest, IFRS and !ENF, using generic firm examples. IFRS is a binary indicator 
variable for firm-quarters with IFRS reporting that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the calendar quarter following the first fiscal-year end after IFRS 
became mandatory. For instance, firm #2 with a fiscal year end in June is required to report under IFRS after 12/31/2005 and hence, the IFRS variable switches 
to ‘1’ in Q3 of 2006. Firm #3 does not fall under the IFRS mandate, e.g., because it only prepares legal-entity but no consolidated accounts. Firm #4 already 
reported under IFRS before 2005. To test for additional liquidity effects as IFRS become mandatory, the IFRS variable switches to ‘1’ in Q1 of 2006. !ENF is 
a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the calendar quarter following the first fiscal-year end after a substantive change (!) in 
enforcement took effect. For instance, firm #2’s annual reports are subject to increased scrutiny by the local supervisory authority after Q4 in 2006 and hence, 
the !ENF variable switches to ‘1’ in Q3 of 2007 when the next annual report becomes available. The resulting variation in IFRS and !ENF (across firms and 
over time) allows us to introduce fixed effects for each country (and industry) as well as for every quarter of our sample period for EU, the remaining IFRS, 
and the benchmark countries, separately. The latter implies that the model includes three separate and completely flexible quarterly time trends. 
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Figure 2: Time-Series Variation of Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Substantive Enforcement Changes 
Panel A: Time-Series Pattern of Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Time-Series Pattern of Substantive Enforcement Changes 
 
 
 
 
The figure illustrates the time-series variation in mandatory IFRS adoption (Panel A) and substantive enforcement 
changes (Panel B), which we use for our identification strategy. We identify substantive enforcement changes (e.g., 
the initiation of a proactive review process of financial statement information by the local supervisory authority) by 
conducting a survey of national regulators and audit firms and based on publicly available sources (see the 
Appendix). In Panel A, the sample consists of all firms from 35 IFRS adoption countries (EU and non-EU) over the 
2001 to 2009 period. We determine the beginning of mandatory IFRS reporting as the calendar quarter immediately 
following the fiscal-year end after the IFRS mandate took effect. In Panel B, the sample comprises all firms from 16 
(IFRS and non-IFRS) countries with substantive enforcement changes over the 2001 to 2009 period. We determine 
the initiation of the enforcement changes as the calendar quarter immediately following the first fiscal-year end after 
the local supervisory authority had instituted the new procedures (e.g., initiated a proactive review process). In both 
panels, we use the bid-ask spread sample as basis, and only plot the first IFRS or enforcement occurrence per firm. 
See also Figure 1 for further details on the coding of the IFRS and !ENF variables. 
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Figure 3: Sample Partitioning to Separate Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Substantive Enforcement Changes 
 
 
The figure illustrates our research strategy to disentangle the liquidity effects of mandatory IFRS adoption and 
substantive enforcement changes. For each empirical test, we partition the sample into various subsets (represented 
by a box containing the respective regression coefficient). We utilize four main sources of variation: (i) whether 
firms in a country are subject to IFRS reporting (IFRS/Benchmark Observations), (ii) membership in the EU 
(EU/non-EU), (iii) whether IFRS adoption is bundled with a substantive change (!) in enforcement (ENF/nonENF), 
and (iv) a country’s regulatory quality (High/Low). In some analyses we further distinguish between firms that 
voluntarily adopted IFRS and first-time mandatory adopters (vol/man), we separately estimate the liquidity effects of 
the (unbundled) substantive enforcement changes (!ENF), and we split the IFRS countries into countries with and 
without (unbundled) substantive enforcement changes over the sample period (nonENF1/nonENF2). The figure also 
indicates for which subset of observations we predict an increase in liquidity under the alternative hypothesis that 
substantive enforcement changes have an effect on liquidity. 
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Table 1: Sample Composition, Institutional Variables, and Variable Coding by Country 
Panel A: Number of Observations and Institutional Variables 
  Institutional Variables (Raw Values)  
Country 
Number of 
Observations 
(Bid-Ask  
Spreads)  
Adoption of 
Mandatory IFRS 
Reporting (Date) 
Substantive ! 
Enforcement 2001-
2009 (No/Yes, Date) 
Regulatory 
Quality 2003 
(Index)  
Number of 
Voluntary IFRS 
Observations 
(Table 5) 
European Union Countries (IFRSEU):     
  Austria 1,201  12/31/05 No 1.52  816 
  Belgium 3,250  12/31/05 No 1.36  707 
  Czech Republic 156  12/31/05 No 1.12  72 
  Denmark 4,802  12/31/05 No 1.79  657 
  Estonia 146  12/31/05 Yes (2003 Q4) 1.40  0 
  Finland 4,056  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q1) 1.90  205 
  France 15,817  12/31/05 No 1.18  1,101 
  Germany 8,296  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q4) 1.51  3,439 
  Greece n.a.  12/31/05 No 1.01  0 
  Hungary 674  12/31/05 Yes (2008 Q1) 1.08  342 
  Iceland 89  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q3) 1.67  0 
  Ireland 629  12/31/05 Yes (2007 Q3) 1.66  0 
  Italy 7,569  12/31/05 No 1.02  3,264 
  Lithuania 71  12/31/05 Yes (2007 Q4) 1.10  0 
  Luxembourg 11  12/31/05 Yes (2009 Q4) 1.94  0 
  Netherlands 3,443  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q4) 1.76  194 
  Norway 4,897  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q4) 1.39  94 
  Poland 5,454  12/31/05 No 0.61  205 
  Portugal 1,361  12/31/05 No 1.21  121 
  Slovakia 63  12/31/05 No 0.95  0 
  Slovenia 208  12/31/05 No 0.88  0 
  Spain 3,195  12/31/05 No 1.29  0 
  Sweden 8,071  12/31/05 Yes (2007 Q3) 1.69  181 
  United Kingdom 18,809  12/31/05 Yes (2005 Q2) 1.68  217 
IFRS Adoption Countries Outside the European Union (IFRSnon-EU):    
  Abu Dhabi 308  12/31/03 No 0.82  0 
  Australia 31,543  12/31/05 No 1.60  523 
  Hong Kong 23,222  12/31/05 Yes (2008 Q3) 1.76  460 
  Israel 385  12/31/08 n.a. 0.91  8 
  New Zealand 3,060  12/31/07 No 1.71  0 
  Pakistan 722  12/31/07 No -0.73  61 
  Philippines 4,495  12/31/05 n.a. -0.06  36 
  Singapore 14,841  12/31/03 No 1.84  789 
  South Africa 6,635  12/31/05 No 0.58  277 
  Switzerland 5,927  12/31/05 No 1.63  3,578 
  Turkey 5,842  12/31/06 Yes (2008 Q1) 0.08  2,019 
Non-IFRS Countries (Benchmark Sample):    
  Argentina 128  n.a. No -0.71  0 
  Brazil 4,585  n.a. No 0.31  0 
  Canada 13,226  n.a. No 1.52  22 
  Channel Islands 436  n.a. n.a. n.a.  0 
  Chile 280  n.a. Yes (2009 Q2) 1.48  0 
  China 39,562  n.a. No -0.39  649 
  Egypt 1,635  n.a. No -0.51  108 
  India 156  n.a. No -0.33  0 
  Indonesia 6,864  n.a. No -0.65  0 
  Japan 108,877  n.a. Yes (2005 Q3) 0.99  35 
  South Korea 28,630  n.a. n.a. 0.67  0 
  Malaysia 26,509  n.a. n.a. 0.66  0 
  Mexico 912  n.a. No 0.37  0 
  Morocco 397  n.a. n.a. -0.18  0 
  Qatar 179  n.a. n.a. 0.28  0 
  Russian Federation 1,114  n.a. No -0.37  240 
  Saudi Arabia 918  n.a. n.a. -0.01  0 
  Sri Lanka 249  n.a. No 0.13  0 
  Taiwan 15,305  n.a. No 0.94  0 
  Thailand 11,526  n.a. No 0.24  30 
  United States 163,016   n.a. n.a. 1.48   0 
(continued) 
Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Binary Indicator Variables for IFRS Adoption and Substantive Enforcement Changes by Country 
IFRS & Substantive ! 
Enforcement in EU  
(Table 3)  
IFRS Conditional on Regulatory  
Quality and ! Enforcement 
(Table 4) 
 
Separating Liquidity Effects of 
IFRS and ! Enforcement 
(Table 6) 
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European Union Countries (IFRSEU):       
  Austria 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Belgium 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Czech Republic 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Denmark 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Estonia 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  Finland 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  France 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Germany 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  Greece 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Hungary 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  Iceland 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  Ireland 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  Italy 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Lithuania 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  Luxembourg 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  Netherlands 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  Norway 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
  Poland 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Portugal 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Slovakia 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Slovenia 0 1  0 1 0 1 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Spain 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Sweden 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0 1 1 
  United Kingdom 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
IFRS Adoption Countries Outside the European Union (IFRSnon-EU):       
  Abu Dhabi 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 
  Australia 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Hong Kong 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  1 1 0 0 1 
  Israel 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 
  New Zealand 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Pakistan 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 
  Philippines 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 
  Singapore 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  South Africa 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 0 1 0 0 
  Switzerland 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 0 
  Turkey 0 0  0 1 0 0 0 1  1 1 0 0 1 
 
The treatment sample consists of all countries in and outside the European Union (EU), which mandated IFRS 
reporting before 2009. We also include Iceland and Norway from the European Economic Area (EEA) in the EU 
sample, as they agreed to adopt the EU capital market directives in their entirety. The sample comprises all firm-
quarter observations over the 2001 to 2009 period with liquidity and control variable data available in Datastream 
and accounting standards information in Worldscope. We exclude firms reporting under U.S. GAAP, cross-listed in 
the U.S., with market values of equity below US$ 5 million, and trading on an unregulated EU market. In Panel A, 
we present (i) the number of firm-quarter observations used in the analysis (based on the bid-ask spread sample), (ii) 
the dates when IFRS reporting became mandatory (Daske et al. 2008), (iii) whether and when a substantive change 
(!) in enforcement occurred over the sample period (based on a survey of national regulators and audit firms and 
publicly available sources; n.a. indicates no reply), (iv) the Regulatory Quality index taken from Kaufman et al. 
(2009) and measured as of 2003, and (v) the number of firm-quarter observations of firms that voluntarily adopted 
IFRS before the mandate (used in Table 5). In Panel B, we present the coding (treatment sample only) of the main 
binary indicator variables we use to analyze the liquidity effects of IFRS adoption and substantive changes in 
enforcement. These country-level variables help us create non-overlapping subsets of IFRS and !ENF (see also 
Figures 1 and 3). For details on the variable definitions see the respective table notes (as indicated in the heading). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Liquidity Regressions 
Panel A: Distributional Characteristics 
 N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Dependent Variables:         
Bid-Ask Spreadt 613,752 0.026 0.046 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.027 0.246 
Zero Returnst 762,094 0.223 0.245 0.000 0.034 0.123 0.333 0.934 
Price Impactt 719,711 2.739 8.767 0.000 0.013 0.120 1.092 49.521 
Total Trading Costst 699,517 0.043 0.045 0.010 0.013 0.026 0.051 0.219 
Liquidity Factort 561,590 -0.089 0.858 -0.745 -0.630 -0.410 0.081 3.355 
         
Independent Variables:        
Market Valuet-4 613,752 1,158 7,701 3 36 126 478 17,207 
Share Turnovert-4 613,752 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.022 
Return Variabilityt-4 613,752 0.027 0.013 0.007 0.017 0.025 0.035 0.066 
 
Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients 
 Zero Returns 
Price 
Impact 
Total 
Trading 
Costs 
Liquidity 
Factor 
Market 
Value 
Share 
Turnover 
Return 
Variability 
Bid-Ask Spreadt 0.670 0.692 0.804 0.901 -0.071 -0.241 0.195 
Zero Returnst  0.472 0.730 0.791 -0.108 -0.337 0.022 
Price Impactt   0.646 0.733 -0.065 -0.151 0.196 
Total Trading Costst    0.972 -0.092 -0.210 0.307 
Liquidity Factort     -0.134 -0.253 0.263 
Market Valuet-4      0.059 -0.071 
Share Turnovert-4       0.226 
 
The sample consists of all firm-quarter observations with liquidity and control variable data available in Datastream 
and accounting standards information in Worldscope from up to 35 IFRS treatment countries and 21 benchmark 
countries over the 2001 to 2009 period. The table presents distributional characteristics (Panel A) and Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients (Panel B) of the dependent variables and the firm-level independent variables used in the 
analyses. The five dependent variables are: (1) The Bid-Ask Spread is the quarterly median quoted spread (i.e., 
difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day). (2) 
Zero Returns is the proportion of trading days with zero daily stock returns out of all potential trading days in a given 
quarter. (3) Price Impact is the quarterly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., daily absolute stock 
return divided by US$ trading volume). (4) Total Trading Costs is a quarterly estimate of total round-trip transaction 
costs (i.e., bid-ask spreads, commissions as well as implicit costs such as short-sale constraints or taxes) inferred from 
the time-series of daily security and aggregate market returns, as developed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka 
(1999). (5) The Liquidity Factor is an aggregate liquidity measure and represents the scores of a single factor 
extracted from the above four liquidity variables employing factor analysis. The continuous independent variables 
consist of the following measures: Market Value is stock price times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ 
million) measured at the end of the quarter. Share Turnover is the quarterly median of the daily turnover (i.e., US$ 
trading volume divided by the market value at the end of each trading day). We compute Return Variability as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given quarter. We report the independent variables for the bid-ask 
spread sample. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level. All variables are truncated at the 1st and 
99th percentile. The subscript t indicates the calendar quarter of variable measurement. 
 
Table 3: Liquidity Effects of IFRS Adoption Globally, in the EU, and in EU Countries with Bundled Substantive Enforcement Changes 
Panel A: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) as the Dependent Variable 
 Global IFRS  EU vs. Non-EU IFRS !
IFRS in EU with vs. without 
Bundled ! Enforcement 
 
Two Quarter-
Year Trends  
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
Other FSAP 
Directives 
Within Country 
Estimation 
Treatment 
Countries Only !
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
Within Country 
Estimation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) ! (6) (7) 
IFRS Variables:          
  IFRS -0.008  – – – –  – – 
 (-0.11)         
  IFRSEU –  -0.178** -0.169** -0.117** -0.200***  – – 
   (-2.51) (-2.43) (-2.00) (-3.26)    
  IFRSEU_ENF –  – – – –  -0.431*** -0.192*** 
        (-3.15) (-4.18) 
  IFRSEU_nonENF –  – – – –  -0.007 -0.071 
        (-0.08) (-0.92) 
  IFRSnon-EU –  0.088 0.088 0.057 0.088  0.088 0.057 
   (1.15) (1.15) (0.68) (1.11)  (1.15) (0.68) 
F-test for Differences [p-value]: [0.01] [0.02] [0.09] [0.01]  [0.02] [0.11] 
Firm-level Control Variables:          
  Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.385***  -0.385*** -0.385*** -0.387*** -0.388***  -0.385*** -0.387*** 
 (-26.05)  (-26.10) (-26.13) (-29.17) (-24.28)  (-26.16) (-29.17) 
  Ln(Share Turnovert-4) -0.306***  -0.306*** -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.253***  -0.307*** -0.307*** 
 (-9.12)  (-9.10) (-9.11) (-9.05) (-16.90)  (-9.16) (-9.05) 
  Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) 0.386***  0.383*** 0.383*** 0.384*** 0.280***  0.386*** 0.384*** 
 (6.77)  (6.59) (6.59) (6.76) (7.09)  (6.71) (6.77) 
Other FSAP Directives:          
  MAD –  – -0.231*** – –  – – 
    (-4.11)      
  TPD –  – -0.308** – –  – – 
    (-2.27)      
  Takeover –  – 0.121 – –  – – 
    (1.60)      
  MiFID –  – 0.021 – –  – – 
    (0.12)      
  PROSP –  – 0.101 – –  – – 
    (1.39)      
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes ! Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects 
Global & 
IFRS 
Countries 
 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
IFRS & EU 
Countries !
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
R-squared 0.767  0.768 0.769 0.795 0.716  0.769 0.795 
Observations 613,752  613,752 613,752 613,752 189,248  613,752 613,752 
(continued) 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Ln(Liquidity Factor + 1) as the Dependent Variable 
 Global IFRS  EU vs. Non-EU IFRS !
IFRS in EU with vs. without 
Bundled ! Enforcement 
 
Two Quarter-
Year Trends  
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
Other FSAP 
Directives 
Within Country 
Estimation 
Treatment 
Countries Only !
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
Within Country 
Estimation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) ! (6) (7) 
IFRS Variables:          
  IFRS -0.035  – – – –  – – 
 (-0.86)         
  IFRSEU –  -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.117*** -0.096**  – – 
   (-3.07) (-3.00) (-2.91) (-2.43)    
  IFRSEU_ENF –  – – – –  -0.259*** -0.195*** 
        (-4.63) (-5.18) 
  IFRSEU_nonENF –  – – – –  -0.040 -0.077 
        (-0.66) (-1.47) 
  IFRSnon-EU –  0.018 0.018 0.028 0.023  0.018 0.028 
   (0.47) (0.47) (0.75) (0.61)  (0.47) (0.75) 
F-test for Differences [p-value]: [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]  [0.01] [0.04] 
Firm-level Control Variables:          
  Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.216***  -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.243***  -0.216*** -0.216*** 
 (-21.26)  (-21.05) (-21.05) (-19.84) (-16.12)  (-21.07) (-19.84) 
  Ln(Share Turnovert-4) -0.146***  -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.140***  -0.147*** -0.150*** 
 (-16.51)  (-16.42) (-16.46) (-18.53) (-18.15)  (-16.54) (-18.54) 
  Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) 0.259***  0.258*** 0.258*** 0.255*** 0.240***  0.259*** 0.255*** 
 (11.42)  (11.46) (11.49) (10.63) (5.97)  (11.67) (10.63) 
Other FSAP Directives:          
  MAD –  – -0.127*** – –  – – 
    (-6.45)      
  TPD –  – -0.112** – –  – – 
    (-2.34)      
  Takeover –  – -0.017 – –  – – 
    (-0.90)      
  MiFID –  – 0.020 – –  – – 
    (0.53)      
  PROSP –  – -0.024 – –  – – 
    (-1.21)      
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes ! Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects 
Global & 
IFRS 
Countries 
 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
IFRS & EU 
Countries !
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
R-squared 0.652  0.653 0.653 0.677 0.676  0.654 0.677 
Observations 561,590  561,590 561,590 561,590 168,793  561,590 561,590 
(continued) 
Table 3 (continued) 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations from up to 35 (21) IFRS treatment (benchmark) countries over the 2001 to 2009 period. We report results for 
two dependent variables: (1) the Bid-Ask Spread measured as the quarterly median quoted spread (Panel A), and (2) the Liquidity Factor equal to the factor 
scores extracted from the four individual measures bid-ask spreads, zero returns, price impact, and total trading costs using factor analysis (Panel B). IFRS is a 
binary indicator variable for firm-quarters with IFRS reporting that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the calendar quarter following the first fiscal-year end 
after IFRS became mandatory. We identify firms that do not follow IFRS after the mandate based on the “accounting standards followed” field in Worldscope 
(field 07536). For the analyses in this table we partition the IFRS observations into non-overlapping subsets using binary indicator variables: (i) We distinguish 
between firms from EU countries (IFRSEU) and firms from outside the EU (IFRSnon-EU). (ii) We further distinguish between firms from EU countries that 
bundled IFRS adoption with substantive changes (!) in enforcement (IFRSEU_ENF), and firms from EU countries with no such bundling (IFRSEU_nonENF). For a 
description of the firm-level controls see Table 2. In Model 3 we also include binary indicator variables for other regulatory changes in the EU, i.e., the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD), the Transparency Directive (TPD), the Takeover Directive (Takeover), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), and 
the Prospectus Directive (PROSP). See Christensen et al. (2013) for details. We include country-, Campbell (1996) industry-, and quarter-year-fixed effects 
(globally, for IFRS countries, EU countries, or each country separately, as indicated in the table) in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. If 
indicated, we use the natural log of the raw values (plus one), and lag the variables by four quarters. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors that are clustered by country and calendar quarter. We also report p-values from Wald tests assessing 
the statistical significance of the differences across the IFRS coefficients (the IFRSEU_ENF and IFRSEU_nonENF coefficients in the last two columns). ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
Table 4: Liquidity Effects of IFRS Adoption Conditional on Regulatory Quality and Substantive Changes in Enforcement 
 Ln(Bid-Ask Spread)  Ln(Liquidity Factor + 1) 
 High vs. Low Regulatory Quality  High vs. Low Regulatory Quality 
  With or without Bundled  ! Enforcement in EU   
With or without Bundled  
! Enforcement in EU 
 
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
(1) 
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
(2) 
Within Country 
Estimation 
(3) 
 
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
(1) 
Three Quarter-
Year Trends 
(2) 
Within Country 
Estimation 
(3) 
Global IFRS:        
  IFRSHigh -0.064 – –  -0.063 – – 
 (-0.64)    (-1.22)   
  IFRSLow 0.115 – –  0.038 – – 
 (1.17)    (0.78)   
IFRS in EU:        
  IFRSEU_ENF – -0.432*** -0.192***  – -0.260*** -0.195*** 
  (-3.17) (-4.18)   (-4.69) (-5.18) 
  IFRSEU_nonENF_High – -0.065 -0.071  – -0.064 -0.111*** 
  (-0.80) (-1.21)   (-1.10) (-6.54) 
  IFRSEU_nonENF_Low – 0.030 -0.071  – -0.024 -0.056 
  (0.24) (-0.63)   (-0.37) (-0.69) 
IFRS outside EU:        
  IFRSnon-EU_High – 0.096 -0.056  – 0.017 -0.021 
  (0.94) (-1.18)   (0.33) (-0.88) 
  IFRSnon-EU_Low – 0.055 0.210**  – 0.021 0.095*** 
  (0.48) (2.49)   (0.53) (3.41) 
F-test for Differences [p-value]:      
  IFRSHigh = IFRSLow [0.21] – –  [0.11] – – 
  IFRSEU_ENF = IFRSEU_nonENF_High – [0.04] [0.02]  – [0.02] [0.01] 
  IFRSEU_ENF = IFRSEU_nonENF_Low – [0.03] [0.29]  – [0.01] [0.10] 
  IFRSEU_ENF = IFRSnon-EU_High – [0.00] [0.00]  – [0.00] [0.00] 
Firm-level Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
R-squared 0.769 0.769 0.795  0.653 0.654 0.678 
Observations 613,752 613,752 613,752   561,590 561,590 561,590 
(continued) 
Table 4 (continued) 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations from up to 35 (21) IFRS treatment (benchmark) countries over the 2001 to 2009 period. We report results for 
Bid-Ask Spreads and the Liquidity Factor as dependent variables. IFRS is a binary indicator variable for firm-quarters with mandatory IFRS reporting. For the 
analyses in this table we partition the IFRS observations into non-overlapping subsets using binary indicator variables: (i) We distinguish between firms from 
countries with above (IFRSHigh) and below (IFRSLow) median values of the Regulatory Quality index taken from Kaufman et al. (2009) and measured as of 
2003. (ii) We distinguish between firms from EU countries that bundled IFRS adoption with substantive changes (!) in enforcement (IFRSEU_ENF), and firms 
with no such bundling but from either above median (IFRSEU_nonENF_High) or below median (IFRSEU_nonENF_Low) Regulatory Quality index countries in the EU. 
Similarly, we partition the IFRS observations outside the EU into those from high and low regulatory quality countries (IFRSnon-EU_High and IFRSnon-EU_Low). 
Throughout the table, we include the full set of firm-level control variables and fixed effects in the models (see Models 2 and 4 in Table 3), but only report 
OLS coefficient estimates (t-statistics, clustered by country and calendar quarter) for the IFRS variables. We also report p-values from Wald tests assessing the 
statistical significance of the differences across select IFRS coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
tailed). 
 
Table 5: Liquidity Effects of IFRS Adoption with Bundled Substantive Enforcement Changes Across Voluntary and Mandatory IFRS Adopters 
 Ln(Bid-Ask Spread)  Ln(Liquidity Factor + 1) 
 
Three Quarter- 
Year Trends 
Within Country 
Estimation   
Three Quarter- 
Year Trends 
Within Country 
Estimation 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Voluntary IFRS (around Mandate) in EU:      
  vol_IFRSEU_ENF -0.269*** -0.303***  -0.224*** -0.234*** 
 (-2.89) (-5.46)  (-3.80) (-3.87) 
  vol_IFRSEU_nonENF 0.088 -0.109  0.058 -0.008 
 (0.76) (-1.42)  (0.79) (-0.13) 
First-Time Mandatory IFRS in EU:      
  man_IFRSEU_ENF -0.443*** -0.178***  -0.255*** -0.182*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.09)  (-4.04) (-6.94) 
  man_IFRSEU_nonENF -0.015 -0.070  -0.049 -0.082 
 (-0.17) (-0.93)  (-0.83) (-1.55) 
IFRS outside EU:      
  IFRSnon-EU 0.088 0.057  0.018 0.027 
 (1.15) (0.68)  (0.46) (0.74) 
F-test for Differences [p-value]:      
  vol_IFRSEU_ENF = vol_IFRSEU_nonENF [0.00] [0.02]  [0.00] [0.01] 
  man_IFRSEU_ENF = man_IFRSEU_nonENF [0.02] [0.20]  [0.03] [0.06] 
Indicator for Voluntary IFRS Adopters in EU Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm-level Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
For Each  
Country 
Separately 
R-squared 0.769 0.795  0.654 0.678 
Observations 613,752 613,752   561,590 561,590 
 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations from up to 35 (21) IFRS treatment (benchmark) countries over the 2001 to 2009 period. We report results for 
Bid-Ask Spreads and the Liquidity Factor as dependent variables. IFRS is a binary indicator variable for firm-quarters with mandatory IFRS reporting. For the 
analyses in this table we partition the IFRS observations into non-overlapping subsets using binary indicator variables. That is, we distinguish between 
voluntary and first-time mandatory IFRS adopters from EU countries that bundled IFRS adoption with substantive changes (!) in enforcement (vol_IFRSEU_ENF 
and man_IFRSEU_ENF), voluntary and first-time mandatory IFRS adopters from EU countries with no such bundling (vol_IFRSEU_nonENF and 
man_IFRSEU_nonENF), and firms from outside the EU (IFRSnon-EU). We identify firms that voluntarily switched to IFRS reporting before 2005 based on Daske et 
al. (2011). Throughout the table, we include the full set of firm-level control variables and fixed effects in the models (see Models 2 and 4 in Table 3). To 
capture selection effects, we also include a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ for voluntary IFRS adopters in the EU. We only report OLS 
coefficient estimates (t-statistics, clustered by country and calendar quarter) for the IFRS variables. We also report p-values from Wald tests assessing the 
statistical significance of the differences across select IFRS coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
tailed). 
Table 6: Separating the Liquidity Effects of IFRS Adoption and Substantive Changes in Enforcement 
 Ln(Bid-Ask Spread)  Ln(Liquidity Factor + 1) 
 
! Enforcement 
in EU 
Countries 
! Enforcement Globally  
(i.e., in IFRS &  
Non-IFRS Countries) 
 
! Enforcement 
in EU 
Countries 
! Enforcement Globally  
(i.e., in IFRS &  
Non-IFRS Countries) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement Changes (Not Bundled with IFRS):        
  !ENFEU -0.175 – –  -0.053* – – 
 (-1.50)    (-1.86)   
  !ENFIFRS – -0.363*** -0.369***  – -0.165*** -0.172*** 
  (-3.72) (-3.72)   (-2.86) (-2.74) 
  !ENFJapan – -0.113** -0.113**  – -0.163*** -0.163*** 
  (-2.17) (-2.17)   (-7.48) (-7.48) 
IFRS with Bundled ! Enforcement (in EU):        
  IFRSEU_ENF -0.441*** -0.452*** -0.452***  -0.263*** -0.269*** -0.269*** 
 (-3.24) (-3.30) (-3.30)  (-4.73) (-4.83) (-4.81) 
IFRS without Bundled ! Enforcement:        
  IFRSEU_nonENF -0.002 – –  -0.039 – – 
 (-0.02)    (-0.63)   
  IFRSnon-EU 0.088 – –  0.018 – – 
 (1.15)    (0.47)   
  IFRSnonENF – 0.003 –  – -0.036 – 
  (0.03)    (-0.58)  
  IFRSnonENF1 (! Enforcement but not bundled) – – 0.026  – – -0.014 
   (0.33)    (-0.21) 
  IFRSnonENF2 (No ! Enforcement) – – -0.001  – – -0.040 
   (-0.01)    (-0.63) 
Firm-level Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-Year Fixed Effects 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
Global,  
IFRS & EU 
Countries 
R-squared 0.769 0.770 0.770  0.654 0.656 0.656 
Observations 613,752 613,752 613,752   561,590 561,590 561,590 
(continued) 
Table 6 (continued) 
The sample comprises firm-quarter observations from up to 35 (21) IFRS treatment (benchmark) countries over the 2001 to 2009 period. We report results for 
Bid-Ask Spreads and the Liquidity Factor as dependent variables. IFRS is a binary indicator variable for firm-quarters with mandatory IFRS reporting. !ENF is 
a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the calendar quarter following the first fiscal-year end after a substantive change (!) in 
enforcement took effect (e.g., the initiation of a proactive review process of financial statement information by the local supervisory authority). We identify the 
timing of substantive enforcement changes based on a survey of national regulators and audit firms and publicly available sources (see Table 1). For the 
analyses in this table we partition the IFRS and !ENF observations into subsets using binary indicator variables: (i) Focusing on enforcement changes in the 
EU, we distinguish between observations from EU countries that bundled IFRS adoption with enforcement changes (IFRSEU_ENF), IFRS and, separately, 
enforcement observations in EU countries with no such bundling (IFRSEU_nonENF and !ENFEU), and IFRS observations from outside the EU (IFRSnon-EU). (ii) 
Focusing on enforcement changes globally, we distinguish between observations from countries that bundled IFRS adoption with enforcement changes (all in 
the EU, i.e., IFRSEU_ENF), IFRS and, separately, enforcement observations in IFRS countries with no such bundling (IFRSnonENF and !ENFIFRS), and 
enforcement observations in countries that did not adopt IFRS, namely Japan (!ENFJapan). (iii) We further split the IFRSnonENF coefficient into observations 
from countries that instituted a substantive enforcement change but did not bundle it with IFRS adoption (IFRSnonENF1) and observations from countries with no 
enforcement change over the sample period (IFRSnonENF2). Throughout the table, we include the full set of firm-level control variables and fixed effects in the 
models (see Model 2 in Table 3), but only report OLS coefficient estimates (t-statistics, clustered by country and calendar quarter) for the IFRS and !ENF 
variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
